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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Unity Lodge Local 405, UAW

A W A R D
Case #1230 0455

81

and
Pratt & Whitney Machine Tool
Division

In the course of the hearing of the above matter, the
above named Union and Company, and the grievants involved,
settled the dispute.

At the request of the parties and the

grievants I make the settlement my AWARD as follows:
The Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having been duly sworn,
makes the following AWARD:
Without prejudice to the position of the
parties:
1. The discharges of Loscellas Reid and
Robert Rush are set aside and changed to
layoffs for lack of work effective as of
the dates of their discharges.
Reid and Rush shall each receive from the
Company the sum of $1,000.00 as liquidated
damages and said payment shall constitute
a release by Reid and Rush of any and all
claims against the Company.
Reid and Rush expressly waive and relinquish
any recall rights they may have under the
contract, and the Union agrees to that waiver.
Reid and Rush acknowledge that the Union
has fully and fairly represented them in
this matter.
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2. John Kozlowski and Walter Goula shall
each receive one and one-half days pay of
the three days pay each lost by their three
day suspensions. It is recognized that by
operation of the contract the records of
the three day suspensions have been removed
from the files.
3. Mr. Schmertz shall retain jurisdiction
for the application and implementation of
the foregoing.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January 26, 1983
STATE OF New York )gg .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Unity Lodge Local 405, UAW

and

OPINION
and
AWARD
Case No. 12 30 0072 83

Pratt & Whitney Machine Tool Division

The issue in dispute is the Union's grievance dated
October 7, 1982 which reads in pertinent part:
Violation of Contract Article VII, Section 3,
subparagraph (a) including but not limited to
past practice thereunder. Steward Judy Lee is
improperly laid off0
A hearing was held on September 29, 1983 at which time
representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Union and the

Company filed post-hearing memoranda.

Article VII Section 3 reads:
SECTION 3. (a) Despite the provisions of the
foregoing sections of this article, officers
of the Union (not exceeding eight), trustees
(not exceeding three), Skilled Trades Chairman, Vice Chairman and Secretary, members of
the Negotiating Committee (not exceeding ten),
members of the Executive Board (not exceeding
twelve), Chief Stewards (three Chandler Evans
and three Pratt & Whitney Machine Tool Division)
and Stewards (not exceeding two percent in
each Company of all employees represented by
the Union in that Company), who shall have
been in the employ of that Company at least
one year or more, shall, in the event of a
layoff for an indefinite period, head the
seniortiy list during their term of office.

-2Such seniority shall, for officers, trustees,
Skilled Trades Chairman, Vice Chairman and
Secretary, members of the Executive Board,
Committeemen and Chief Stewards, be in their
respective Company and Stewards in their
Department.
The basic question in this case is when and how often the
number of Union stewards is to be adjusted to correspond to the
2% ratio referred to in the foregoing clause.
If the adjustment is to be made continuously, frequently
or contemporaneously with increases, or as in this case, decreases
in the size of the bargaining unit, Judy Lee, the grievant herein,
would have lost her status as a steward and its attendant superseniority because she represented an "excess" over the prescribed
maximum.

In that event, left only with her natural seniority she

would have been subject to the layoff which the Company imposed
on her and the grievance on her behalf would fail.
The contract is silent on when the adjustments are to be
made to bring or keep the number of stewards at the 2% level.

It

seems to me that while the parties may not have contemplated the
magnitude of the recent or current drop in bargaining unit employees, they nonetheless could and should have anticipated some
periodic changes in the size of the bargaining unit which would
affect not only the number of stewards allowed but which would
also raise the question of when the adjustments should take place
That they did not provide for the latter as part of the contract
means, under traditional contract interpretation, that adjustment:
are to be made at reasonable times.
Also, to not provide an explicit procedure or time

-3for the ratio adjustment and considering how these matters were
previously handled, persuade me that a "tenure" or "term" for
stewards was impliedly agreed to or mutually understood.

I agree

that the traditional and principal reason for a steward's superseniority is to immunize them from layoff thereby insuring their
continued presence as union representatives of and for the remaining bargaining unit employees, regardless of what their natural
seniority may be.

But the record in this case shows that in a

significant number of prior instances, the Company permitted the
number of steward to exceed the 2% ratio.

That fact leads me

to conclude that stewards had acquired a two-fold set of rights the right of super-seniority and the right to remain as stewards
1
for their elected terms of two years.
Reasonableness in implementing the critical contract clause
is found in how the parties have handled similar situations in the
past.

Here there has been a past practice, and it has been to

make mandatory adjustments in the number of stewards bi-annually.
While 1 think an adjustment at earlier intervals would be more
appropriate, I am not prepared to hold that bi-annual adjustments
have not been or are not reasonable.

And in the absence of a

specific contract provision on this question I am not prepared to

1.

In that respect this case differs in my view from the
decision of Arbitrator Walter G. Seinsheimer in Duro Co.,
38 LA 760

-4substitute my judgment for what the parties have done in practice,
This practice is not to be confused with the Union's voluntary agreement in the past to have a stewardship vacant upon the
mutual agreement of the parties when to fill it would create an
excess over the 270. Also, that the Company did not previously
challenge the practice of retaining stewards in excess of the 2%
because never before had the "excess" steward's natural seniority
been low enough to be subject to a layoff, does not make the
retention of stewards disproportionaly above the 2% ratio (until
the bi-annual adjustment) any less a precedential variation from
continuous adherence to a maximum of 2%.
Based on that history I find an implied understanding that
Article VII Section 3 of the contract should be mandatorily
adjusted bi-annually.

A different arrangement is best left for

collective bargaining.

On that basis the grievant should not

have been denied steward status and should not have been laid
off.
AWARD
The grievance is granted. The grievant shall be
made whole for the time lost from the point of
her lay off and shall be recalled to work and
restored to her stewardship. If the end of her
bi-annual term has been reached and if she would
have lost her stewardship at that time under the
27c ratio requirement of Article VII Section 3,
and would have been laid off in accordance with
her natural seniority, her active reemployment
and back pay would end as of that latter date.
And the same shall obtain prospectively.

DATED: November 21, 1983
STATE OF New York )
ss °
COUNTY OFNew York ) " "

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby a f f i r m upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

D R A F T

Agreement entered into effective June 1, 1982 between
Lodge Local 405 UAW, hereinafter referred to as the "Union" and Pratt
& Whitney Machine Tool Division, hereinafter referred to as the "Company."
A.

Within the context and without any prejudice to the

collective bargaining agreement, the Agreement of September
10, 1981 (Joint Exhibit #2 in the record) and the Attendance
Control Program, the Company and Union agree as follows:
I.

American Arbitration Association Case #12 30 0455 —
is resolved.

II.

All pending grievances involving disc

.inary

warnings arising out of the Atrs-eft4.&e (sontrol
Program shall be resolved as follows:
a.

The Company will withdraw and expunge from

the records of the employees involved, all warnings which are still effective, and the Union
will withdraw the grievances in those matters.
b.

Warnings which have or had been in the

effected employee records for ten months have
been expunged from the employee records by
operation of Article VIII Section 3 of the
collective bargaining agreement.

The Union shall

withdraw the grievances in those cases.

[/

*^ *"£'"'

2.
III. The grievances j/nvolv ing the suspension^ of Messrs.
Goula yy&- Rush/ and the discharge of Mr/^eld shall be
the subject of mediation, with Mr. Schmertz serving
as the mediator.

If mediation fails to resolve those

grievances, they shall be settled by arbitration and
Mr. Schmertz shall be the arbitrator.

An early sched-

ule for the mediation and if needed, arbitration shall
be set.
IV.

Three lists, designated as Lists 1, 2, and 3 are attached
hereto and made a part thereof.

These lists set forth

the types of circumstances under which employees may be
granted excused time off without pay from their work schedule without incurring disciplinary points under the
Attendance Control Program.

Lists 1, and 2 apply to &

work schedule of 45 hours or more per week.

List 3

applies to any weekly work schedule.
With regard to the type of athletic activities referred
to on List #1 (i.e. bowling leagues, softball leagues,
little league commitment, golf leagues) the Company will
grant excused time off without disciplinary points for
one such occurrence a week

whether it be a Company sponsored

or non-company athletic activity.
With regard to the remaining item on List #1 (medical
appointments) and all items on List #2, the Company will
grant excused time off without disciplinary points to the

3.

to the extent consistent with the production needs of
the Company, but an excusal shall not be unreasonably
withheld.

._,„...

With regard to List #3, the Company will

grant excused time off without disciplinary points for
bona fide emergencies beyond the employee's control.
With regard to some of the items on all lists, such
as medical appointments, illnesses, conferences, personal
business and emergencies, the Company may require substantiation or verification.

V,

If any employee works seven hours of his scheduled
shift and thereby qualifies for Holiday Pay under Article
IX Section 3(a)(ii) of the contract, he may leave work
at the end of that time without incurring disciplinary
points.

But if he reports to work late after the beginning

of any such shift, works seven hours thereafter and qualifies for holiday pay, he will receive disciplinary points
for the period of- time of his lateness pursuant to the

^^^^M
~'*^ whether or not he leaves work
ADoonfeoe
CdntisAl FProgram,
at the end of said seven hours of work.

VI.

Employees who are given excused time off under the foregoing circumstances shall not have the balance of their
then scheduled work week otherwise shortened because of
that excusal(s).

4.
VII. On a "red-circled" basis the weekly work schedule of
Vincent Baltas shall be restored.

He shall be permitted

to leave work at 2:30 P.M. so that he may ready himself
for other employment in the Post Office of which the
Company is aware, and which begins at 4 PM.
VIII.

Henceforth the following shall be the procedure for

counseling and for the imposition of discipline under
the Attendance Control Program:
When the Company's representative counsels an
employee or gives an employee his first verbal
warning, a Union Steward shall be present.
Grievances arising therefrom, if any, may be
processed under the grievance procedures of
the contract.
Subsequent disciplinary action, namely a further
verbal warning, a written warning, suspensions
and discharges shall not be imposed on the employee by the Company until there has been a
"just cause" meeting between representatives
of the Union, and Company.

The representatives

of the Union at such a meeting in addition to
the affected employee, shall be the divisional
steward, and the employee's steward.

The

Company's representative at such meeting shall
be the employee's foreman, and a representative

of the Personnel Department.

The subject

of the meeting shall be whether there is
"just cause" for the disciplinary penalty
the Company plans to impose.

If the question

is not resolved the Company may impose the
discipline and the Union may grieve beginning
at Step 2 of the grievance procedure.

If any

such grievance goes to arbitration, it shall
be arbitrated by Mr. Schmertz.
Mr. Schmertz shall schedule a hearing on an expedited basis.

With the agreement of both sides,

Mr. Schmertz may appoint a designee to hear any
such case but the decision of the designee shall
be reviewed by and be subject to the approval of
Mr. Schmertz.

IX. The foregoing (I through VIII) shall be effective for
a trial period from June 1 through September 30, 1982.
It may be terminated by either or both sides effective
12 midnight on September 30, 1982 by notice on or before
that time.

If it is not so terminated, it shall continue

X. Arbitrator Schmertz retains jurisdiction over all the
foregoing for its application, interpretation and
implementation.

Mr. Schmertz shall have jurisdiction

over any and all disputes arising therefrom during
the effective term of this agreement, and may decide
said disputes even if hearings thereof are scheduled
after the termination of the agreement.

As set forth

in Item VIII above, Mr. Schmertz may, with the agreement of both parties, appoint a designee on any such
matters, but the decision of the designee shall be
reviewed by and shall be subject to Mr. Schmertz's
approval.

FOR THE UNION

X/

FOR THE COMPANY:
,/u

LIST

1

Regular, recurring and/or scheduled times that certain identified
employees must leave work, when their work schedule is 45 hours
or more.
(Known persons who go to meetings or functions or appointments or
planned occurrence)
1.

Bowling leagues

2.

Softball leagues

*3.

Medical appointments

4.

Little league commitments

5.

Golf league

LIST

2

Based principally on past practice those non-regular times
when any employees either must or should be allowed to leave
work.

45 or more hours.

1. Personal illness on the job
2. Family illness at home
3. School conference for child
4. Personal business: driver's license exam, court appearance;
graduations, weddings, funerals (not
covered by bereavement), other legal
proceedings.

LIST

3

Any circumstance where we think they should be allowed to
leave work regardless of the length of the work week.

1. Any emergency situation beyond the control of the
employee

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Steelworkers of America,
Local Union No.
1834

AWARD
Grievance No,
82/06

and
Pullman Standard Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company's announcement on February 3,
1982 that its passenger car plants at
Chicago and Hammond were permanently closed
effective that date, and its consequent use
of February 3, 1982 as the permanent closing
date in determining employee rights affected
by the date of permanent closure did not violate Section XXIII of the 1981 collective
bargaining agreement.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: November 16, 1983
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Steelworkers of America,
Local Union No.
1834

OPINION
Grievance No. 82/06

and
Pullman Standard Company

The stipulated issue is:
"Whether, under the facts adduced, the
Company's announcement on February 3, 1982,
that its passenger car plants at Chicago
and Hammond were permanently closed effective that date, and its consequent use of
February 3, 1982, as the permanent closing
date in determining employee rights that
are affected by the date of permanent closure, violated Section XXIII of the 1981
collective bargaining agreement between United
Steelworkers of America and Pullman Standard."
The parties were unable to similarly stipulate a question
with respect to remedy.

Based on the record, I deem the matter

of remedy, if any^ is covered by the following additional question
"If the Company violated Section XXIII
of the 1981 collective bargaining agreement,
what shall be the remedy, if any?"
Hearings were held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania on February
8, 1983 and February 9, 1983 at which times representatives of
Pullman Standard Company, hereinafter referred to as the "Company,
and United Steelworkers of America, Local Union No. 1834, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," appeared. All concerned were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

A stenographic record was

taken and the Union and the Company filed post-hearing briefs.
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The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The dispute between the Union and the Company in this
proceeding concerns the appropriate date from which to calculate
eligibility and the amount of severance pay for Union employees
who were terminated as a result of the permanent closure of
Pullman Passenger Car Works in Chicago, Illinois (PCW 1) and
Hammond, Indiana (PCW 2).

The Company has distributed severance

pay by determining eligibility and amount as if the plants were
permanently closed
1982.

and the employees terminated on February 3,

On that date, the Company sent the Union a telegram in-

forming it of the Company's intention to permanently close PCW 1
and PCW 2, effective immediately.

The Union has filed this

grievance contending that all rights relating to severance allowance should be determined as if the plants were closed and the
employees terminated as of May 4, 1982, ninety days after the
Union's receipt of the Company's telegram.

The Union seeks this

award as a remedy for the Company's alleged breach of the provisions of Section XXIII of the 1981 collective bargaining agreement which requires that the Company give the Union 90 days
advance written notice of its intention to permanently close the
plant.

As the Union contends that the only advance written

notice given to the Union was the Company's February 3, telegram,
all rights to severance pay should be determined as if the closure
occured 90 days thereafter.

The Company estimates that the

remedy sought would approach $500,000 in additional severance

-3-

1
pay entitlements.
CONTRACTUAL

PROVISIONS

Section XXIII, hereinafter Section 23 of the current
collective bargaining agreement between the parties provides
in pertinent part:
SEVERANCE ALLOWANCE
A.

Conditions of Allowance

When in the sole judgment of the Company, it decides to close permanently a plant or discontinue
permanently a department of a plant or substantial
portion thereof and terminate the employment of
individuals, an employee whose employment is terminated either directly or indirectly as a result
thereof because he was not entitled to other employment with the Company under the provisions of
Section VI Seniority of this Agreement and Paragraph B2 below shall be entitled to a severance
allowance in accordance with and subject to the
following provisions.
Before the Company shall finally decide to close
permanently a plant or discontinue permanently a
department of a plant, it shall give the Union,
when practicable, advance written notification
of its intention. Such notification shall be
given at least 90 days prior to the proposed closure date, and the Company will thereafter meet
with appropriate Union representatives in order to
discuss the Company's proposed course of action.
Upon conclusion of such meetings, prior to the proposed closure or partial closure date, the Company
shall advise the Union of its final decision. The

Apparently a significant number of additional employees would
be entitled to severance allowances if the determinative date
were May 4, 1982 rather than February 3, 1982. These employees were those hired in February, March and April, 1979,
to accelerate the completion of certain work which was then
in progress.

-4Final closure shall be the exclusive function of
the Company. This notification provision shall
not be interpreted to offset the Company's right
to lay off or in any other way reduce or increase
the working force in accordance with its presently existing rights as set forth in Section IV of
this Agreement.
B. Eligibility
Such an employee to be eligible for a severance
allowance shall have accumulated three or more
years of continuous company service as computed
in accordance with Section VI Seniority of this
Agreement....
C. Scale of Allowance
An eligible individual shall receive severance
allowance based upon the following weeks for
the corresponding continuous company service:
Continuous Company
Service
3 years but
5 years but
7 years but
10 years or

Weeks of Severance
Allowance

less than 5 years
less than 7 years
less than 10 years
more

4
6
7
8

F. Election Concerning Layoff Status
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement an employee who would otherwise have been
terminated in accordance with the applicable provisions of this Agreement and under the circumstances specified in Section XXIII A may, at such
time, elect to be placed upon layoff status for
30 days or to continue on layoff status for an
additional 30 days if he had already been on layoff
status. At the end of such 30-day period he may
elect to continue on layoff status or to be terminated and receive severance allowance under the
provisions of this Section XXIII; provided, however, if he elects to continue on layoff status
after the 30-day period specified above, and is
unable to secure employment with the Company within an additional 60-day period, at the conclusion
of such additional 60-day period he may elect to
be terminated and receive severance allowance if

-5he is eligible for such allowance....
G. Payment of Allowance
Payment shall be made in a lump sum at the time
of termination. Acceptance of severance allowance shall terminate employment and continuous
service for all purposes under this Agreement.
Section VI (C) provides that:
"Continuous service shall be broken by:

(f) Termination, in accordance with Section
XXIII - Severance Allowance."
Agreements between the Parties Relating to the
Effective Date of Paragraph 2 of Section 23A.
The Union's grievance is based upon its contention that
the Company's actions herein violated the 90-day notice requirement of paragraph 2 of Section 23A.

As a result of agreements

between the parties which were reached in April of 1981, that
paragraph was added as an amendment to the text of Section 23A
of the 1978 collective bargaining

agreement.

More specifically, on April 8, 1981, after a strike, the
Union and the Company executed an "Agreement in Principle" which
provided in pertinent part:
"Collective bargaining negotiations having taken
place and been concluded, an agreement in principle as to changes in the labor agreements dated
April 4, 1978 between Pullman Standard (the Company)
and the United Steelworkers of America (the Union)
has been entered into as of April 8, 1981 by the
Company and the Union.... The details of this Agreement shall be reduced to writing in a timely fashion.
The main points of this Agreement are as
1.

The agreement shall be effective April 4, 1981

-6except as otherwise thereafter provided and
shall terminate 60 days after notice by one
party to the other, but not earlier than
April 4, 1984.
Other dates shall be adjusted as appropriate.
2. The terms of the labor agreement for production and maintenance employees dated April
4, 1978 shall be continued in effect (including COLA adjustments and roll-in) as is, effective April 4, 1981 until April 4, 1982, except
as provided in 5_ below.
3. The terms of the Basic Steel Industry Agreement dated April 15, 1980 as applicable to
Pullman Standard shall be incorporated into the
labor agreement for production and maintenance
employees dated April 4, 1981 as follows:
a) First year Steel Industry changes shall
be effective April 4, 1982 (and otherwise
as consistent with such Steel Industry
Agreement.)
b) Second year Steel Industry changes shall
be effective April 4, 1983 (and otherwise as
consistent with such Steel Industry Agreement.)
c) Third year Steel Industry changes shall
be effective October 4, 1983 (and otherwise
as consistent with such Steel Industry Agreement. )

8. The foregoing constitutes a complete and
final settlement of all matters pending before
the parties."
Thereafter, the parties entered into a "Memorandum of
2
Settlement Agreement," dated April 8, 1981, which provides in
pertinent part:

2.

The record does not reflect the exact date on which the
parties actually executed this agreement.

-7"The parties have met in collective bargaining for the purpose of negotiating in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment and other conditions of employment and
having concluded negotiations for the term
and subject to the provisions hereof, the
Company and the Union hereby respectively agree to the following revisions in and amendments to the Labor Agreement between the
parties, as most recently amended April 4,
1978 (effective April 4, 1978) and the other
agreements between the parties hereinafter
referred to.
The Company and the Union hereby agree that
the following revisions and amendments shall
be effective as provided herein and shall be
promptly incorporated with the terms and conditions of the respective Agreements affected,
which Agreements shall otherwise in all respects continue in effect subject to the revisions and amendments hereby made or provided
for and Notwithstanding prior provisions herein)
terminable only in accordance with their respective new termination dates provided ....
The parties also agree to make all necessary
"housekeeping" changes in the Agreement.
New Agreement
1.

Labor Agreement

All changes as to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment and other conditions of employment in the Labor Agreement between the parties
dated April 4, 1978 (effective April 4, 1978)
shall be as described in Exhibit A, attached
hereto and specifically made a part hereof, and
said agreement as so changed will be identified
as the Labor Agreement of April 8, 1981, and so
dated.
Exhibit A describes a number of changes, including the
addition of the second paragraph of the current version of
Section 23 (A).

The Amendment to Section 23 (A) does not con3
tain an explicit, individualized effective date, although

3. In addition, the Amendments to Section II (Scope of Agreements ) (removing the Bessemer and Hammond Plants); Section VI
(Seniority) and Section XV (Vacations) (minor changes in
detail) also do not specify individual effective dates.

-8-

4
additions and changes to other Sections do contain such dates.
Exhibit A also contains the following provisions:
"Termination Date
1. Substitute the following for the present
subsection XXVII, A:
A. This Agreement of April 8, 1981, effective April 4, 1981, except as otherwise
provided herein, shall continue in effect
subject to the following provisions."
Although the record reflects that the parties intended to
incorporate into one document the 1981 amendments and the 1978
provisions still in effect, such integration did not take place.
FACTS
March and April of 1979
The minutes of the March 21, 1979 meeting of the Board of
Directors of Pullman Incorporated reflect that the Board "approve
the recommendation to discontinue the passenger car operation
consistent with management's recommendations." Management had
recommended that Pullman discontinue its passenger car manufacturing operation on the completion of the pending orders, take
no

new orders and "shut down the facilities at the termination

of those contracts." Shortly after the Board meeting Mr. Robert
Stanek, the Controller of the Passenger Car Division, prepared
shutdown estimates for PCW 1 and PCW 2.
for severance pay.

These included a reserve

The reserve was "booked" for accounting

4. Thus, changes to Section X (Shift Differentials), Section
XII (Adjustment of Grievances) and Section XVIII (Safety
and Health) are expressly made effective April 4, 1982.
Changes in Rates of Pay (Section VIII), Insurance and
Pensions (Section XX), Supplemental Unemployment Benefit Plan
(Section XXIV) and Savings & Vacation Plan (XXV) also contain
specific effective dates.

-9purposes in 1979 and the severance allowances which have already
been paid by the Company have been charged to that reserve.

In

addition, the Company's 1979 Annual Report, in a footnote, stated
that "at the end of the first quarter of 1979 the Company
decided to discontinue its rail passenger car manufacturing
operations upon completion of its contracts in process...."
The Report notes the estimated closing costs which "are comprised
principally of severance benefits and the expected results from
disposal of fixed assets."

It also states that "It is antic-

ipated that these contracts will be completed during 1981, after
which the manufacturing facilities will be sold or put to other
use."

There is no evidence in the record to indicate that the

Union received copies of these corporate documents.
The Union did, however, receive from the Company a copy
of the Press Release issued by the Company on March 21, 1979.
That document announced the Company's decision to "withdraw
from its rail passenger car business as soon as practicable
upon completion of contracts in process" and to record a withdrawal charge including the "cost of closing down of fixed
assets."

The Press Release also stated "Pullman is presently

studying the ultimate disposition of the physical assets employee
in the passenger unit, whether by sale or utilization in other
Pullman business lines." In addition, on March 21, 1979, the
Company's then President sent a letter to all passenger unit
employees which stated in part:

-10-

"No final decision has been made with respect
to the ultimate disposition of the physical
assets of the passenger plants. We are examining ways to determine the best use for these
facilities including possible use in freight
car operations....
Some of you must be aware that during our long
history, Pullman Standard has manufactured
other products, including aircraft components,
ships and other military hardwear using these
facilities.
I assure you that we will keep you informed
as developments occur."
5
And on April 4, 1979, James M. Coyne, the then District
Director of District 19 of the Union, wrote Mr. Raymond Gorski,
the Company's then Vice President - Labor Relations, stating:
"The news release issued on March 21, 1979,
indicated that the Company was studying the
ultimate disposition of the physical assets
as to sale or utilization in other Pullman
business lines. I would appreciate hearing
from you on the matter before I arrange with
our Insurance and Pension experts for potential shutdown meets."
April 1979 - October 1980
Between April 1979 and October 1980 PCWl and PCW2 continued
6
to manufacture passenger cars. During this period, John Bowman,
President of the Local 1834, formed a Save Our Jobs Committee as
part of the Union's efforts to exert political and other
community pressures to avoid the shutting down of, and loss of

5.

Mr. Coyne passed away in 1982.

6.

In fact, passenger cars were manufactured at PCW 1 until
May 1981 and at PCW 2 until March 1981.

-11jobs at these plants.

In fact, the July 1980 edition of the

Union's Local newspaper (1834 Express) reported that President
Bowman would introduce a resolution at the Annual Steelworkers
International Convention, which began "Whereas, Pullman Standard
has announced

its intention to close the passenger car plants in

Hammond, Indiana and Chicago, Illinois" and asked that it be
resolved that "The Federal Government.... guarantee the continued
operation of both Pullman Passenger Car Plants for the good of
the country." Other articles from the May 1980 and June

1980

editions of the Local Union newspaper expressed serious concern
over shutdowns.

In addition, an article in the July 31, 1980

edition of the Daily World reported that "As soon as Pullman
workers finish AMTRAK's order.... the plants are to be shut down.
Workers expect that will happen in early 1981."

That article

also discussed President Bowman's appearance on the Phil Donahue
TV show where he reportedly stated that "Pullman is pulling out
of making passenger trains and is investing in oil.
give a damn about workers or the country.
7
in making greater profits...."

They don't

They're only interestec

However, two of the Company's own witnesses testified that
they did not view Mr. Bowman as having authority on behalf of
the Union to decide any matters or to negotiate concerning plant

7.

In November, 1979, a newsletter written and distributed by
a slate of the candidates for union office, which included
the then candidate John Bowman, stated that Pullman had
announced it was "shutting down our two plants
PCW 1
and PCW 2."

-12-

shutdowns.

And there is no evidence in the record indicating

that the Company had changed its prior position on plan closure
during this time period.

Indeed, the Company conducted studies

to analyze the possibility of using one or both plants in the
Company's freight car manufacturing business.
October 1980 - March 1981
In October, 1980 Pullman was purchased by Wheelabrator-Frye
The Chairman of Wheelabrator announced publicly that all
options relative to Pullman would be examined, including the
decision to withdraw from the passenger car manufacturing busines
In November, 1980 the Chicago Tribune reported that a
Wheelabrator spokesman said "We shall continue to give consideration to staying in the business of building (rail) passenger
cars." Mr. Corksi, the Company's own witness, testified that in
March of 1981, the then President of Pullman Transportation,
Mr. Tom Begel, met with the Union negotiating committee in
connection with the negotiations for the new contract.

At that

time President Begel stated that the status of the passenger car
8
business was still under review.

8.

Mr. Gorski also testified that he met Mr. Coyne in February,
1981 and told him he "saw nothing that should be taken as
encouragement that Pullman would continue in business" and
that there was "absolutely no change" in policy as a result
of Wheelabrator's review. Mr. Gorski also testified that
in January, 1981 he told Coyne that the Company had decided
that all of the freight car activity would be consolidated
into the Butler freight car plant. These meetings, however,
took place prior to Mr. Begel's meeting with the negotiating
committee in early March. In addition, Mr. Gorski admitted
that in his February discussion with Coyne, he was expressing
his own opinion and not an official company position.
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The record further reflects that during the course of
negotiations with respect to the 1981 collective bargaining
agreement, Mr. Gorski spoke to the Chairman of Wheelabrator
on the status of the passenger car situation and reported back
9
to the Union that the "review was still under way.
April 1981
The new three-year collective bargaining agreement which
was entered into between the parties in April of 1981, included
both PCW 1 and PCW 2.

This was so even though the work at PCW 2

was completed by about the end of March, 1981 and the work at
PCW 1 was expected to be completed by early June of 1981.

On

the other hand, the new agreement specifically excluded the
Hammond and Bessemer Freight Parts Plants.

The evidence reflects

that these plants were excluded because before the new negotiations began the Company had permanently closed the Bessemer plant
and decided to permanently close the Hammond plant.

However,

Hammond (like PCW 1) was finishing up its last production order
at the time the new contract was entered into.

The Company and

the Union agreed that the employees at Hammond would complete
the work under the terms of the existing 1978 labor agreement,
and that the plant would be excluded from the scope of the new
1981 Agreement.

9.

Mr. Gorski admitted that he may have even prefaced his report
with words such as "good news" or something of that nature.
He denied, however, that he said "Pullman is still pursuing
a strong desire to stay in the passenger car business
recognizing it is the last of its kind in the United States."
Mr. Bowman testified for the Union that Mr. Gorski did in fac
make that statement to the Union negotiators.

-14During the negotiations, there was no discussion specifically related to the content of the amendment to Section 23A .
That amendment had been included in the 1980 Basic Steel Industry
Agreement.

The Parties simply followed their past practice of

incorporating in their agreement the changes in wages and conditions of employment which had been previously negotiated for the
Basic Steel Industry.
Nor were there any discussions or negotiations specifically
addressed to the effective date of the amendment to Section 23A.
There were, however, extensive negotiations concerning the effective date of the increases in wages and economic fringe benefits
provided in the Basic Steel Industry agreement.

Eventually, a

one year respite on those items was agreed to by both parties,
although the full economic benefits contained in the Steel
Industry agreement were to be phased in over the last two years
of the Pullman collective bargaining agreement.

The Company

offered testimony to the effect that both parties understood that
other than specific changes mentioned in the Agreement in
Principle and COLA adjustments, there would be "no changes what10
soever" from the 1978 Agreement until April 4, 1982.
Further,

10.

The Company also relied on the express terms of the Agreement
in Principle to support its position on the 1982 effective
date. In addition it also introduced its own notes of the
Union's "rock bottom proposals." Those notes state in part:
2) 1 yr. respite on wages & benefits.... 3) full impact of
basic steel settlement applied on appropriate dates in 2nd
& 3rd yrs. of the agreement, as mutually agreed upon by the
parties ....

-15the Company introduced testimony to the effect the Memorandum of
Settlement Agreement was intended only to incorporate the matters
agreed to in the Agreement in Principle as a vehicle through
which the changes would be incorporated with the 1978 Agreement
into a full collective bargaining agreement.

However, the

Company in court testified that two typographical errors in the
Memorandum of Settlement Agreement misstated the actual agreement between the parties with respect to the effective date of
the new Section 23 (A).

First, Section 23 (A) and Section 6

(Seniority) should have been preceded by words specifically
reflecting effective date of April 4, 1982.

The Company's

witness noted that other changes reflected that date and noted
that the type face of Section 23 (A) and Section 6 was the same,
but was different from those other sections.

Accordingly, they

concluded that a different typist typed the former provisions
and erroneously forgot to type in the proper effective date.
Second, the Company's witness testified that the duration clause
(Section XXVII) contained an error in punctuation.

The Memoran-

dum of Settlement Agreement incorrectly provides: "A.

This

Agreement of April 8, 1981, effective April 4, 1981, except as
otherwise provided herein, shall continue in effect subject to
the following provisions."

According to the Company's witness

it should have contained a semi-colon, and not a comma, after
11
the phrase "effective April 4, 1981."

11. The 1978 version of this clause contains the Company's version
of the correct punctuation.

-16The Union introduced different testimony as to the parties
intent with respect to the effective date of the new Section 23A.
The Union produced witnesses who testified that the "one year
respite" involved only "wages and benefits" and that other "non12
economic benefits" were to be effective immediately.
Thus,
the Union's witnesses conclude that there were no errors, typographical or otherwise, in the Memorandum of Settlement which
was prepared, read and signed by Company officials.

Rather, it

reflects the understanding of both parties or, at the very least,
13
that of the Union, as to the effective date of Section 23A.
May 1981 - February 3, 1982
In the late spring or early summer of 1981, the City of
New York Metropolitan Transit Authority solicited Pullman to bid
on the manufacture of approximately 1000 rapid transit cars.

The

Company decided to pursue the idea of bidding on the New York
order.

Accordingly, in September, 1981, the Company commenced

negotiations with the Union to determine whether it could gain
enough concessions to make such an operation profitable.

During

the course of these negotiations, however, the Company raised
other possibilities with respect to resuming passenger car
production.

For example, in October, 1981, President Begel

attended a negotiating session and expressed optimism about the
12. The Union also relies on the express language of the Memorandum of Settlement Agreement to support its contention. And
even the Company's witnesses concluded that that document
was the "governing document," at the time of the events in
question.
13. The Union's arguments with respect to the meaning and effect
of the Agreement in Principle are set forth in detail in the
next section of this Opinion.

-17Company's future in the passenger business.

He mentioned that

there were other possible sources of business, and he referred
specifically to Amtrak as one such source.

In addition, on

October 23, 1981 Mr. Begel wrote Congressman Adam Benjamin that
the Company was pursuing possible car contracts with "both
Amtrak and several major metropolitan transit authorities."

He

also stated therein that he was "optimistic that we will favorably conclude these negotiations which could well bring Pullman
back as an active participant in the passenger car business."
Further, in November 1981, the Company

filed a prospectus with

the SEC in which it stated that "Pullman Standard is currently
considering whether to enter the rail passenger car business
that was discontinued by Pullman in 1979...."
In early December of 1981, however, the negotiations between the parties broke off.

The Union's witnesses testified

that the Union officials were not then or at any prior time informed that the consequence was (or would be) a permanent
closure of the plants.

To the contrary, the Union's witnesses

testified that they believed the Company was not retreating from
its interest in the passenger car business.

A Company witness,

Mr. Mclver, testified that he repeatedly advised the Union that
Pullman was "out of business," that the "plants were closed"
and that, once negotiations broke off, the plants would "remain
closed."

However, on cross-examination, Mr. Mclver admitted that

he did not notify the Union that a permanent plant closure within the meaning of Article 23 would result from the Company's

-18fallure to bid on the New York contract; he thought that had
already been done.
On January 3, 1982, the Union sent the Company a telegram
requesting that the talks be resumed, and offering to help seek
an extension of the New York bid-submission deadline.

On

January 5, 1982 President Begel rejected that request stating
in part: "We have relied on your rejection of our final offer
to the extent that it is simply too late for us to entertain
further negotiations at this time." Thereafter, the Company
filed with the SEC an amended prospectus dated February 2, 1982.
The amended document eliminated the reference in the original
prospectus to any consideration of entering the rail passenger
business.

On February 3, 1982 the Company sent the Union a

telegram which stated:
"Pursuant to Section 23 Subsection A of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between
Pullman Standard and the United Steelworkers
of America AFL-CIO dated April 8, 1981 we
regretfully must inform you of the Company's
intention to permanently close its Butler
facility and PCW 1 and PCW 2 effective
February 3, 1982.
Company representatives
are prepared to meet with you and discuss
this matter at your earliest convenience."
Thereafter, the Union filed this grievance contending that
the Company's actions were in violation of Section 23A.

On April

6, 1982, the Company rejected the grievance by a letter written
by John Rozner for the Company.

-19CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
THE COMPANY
The Applicability of the Notice Provisions
The Company contends that its action could not have
constituted a breach of the 90-day advance notice requirements
of Section 23 (A) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement,as
that provision did not become effective until April 4, 1982.
Thus, it asserts that the Union failed to meet its burden of
proving that the Company had any obligation, contractual or
otherwise, to give the Union advance notice of the permanent
plant closures and resulting employee terminations which the
Company accomplished on February 3, 1982.

The Company argues

the contractual language and other evidence demonstrate that
both parties intended that all first year changes in the 1980
Basic Steel Agreement including the corollary to the amendment
to Section 23 (A), were to become effective at the beginning of
the second year of the Pullman Agreement.
The Company relies heavily on the express language of the
Agreement in Principle.

Paragraph 2 of that document states

that the 1978 Pullman Agreement would be "continued in effect....
as is, effective April 4, 1981, until April 4, 1982, except as
provided in 5 below." Thus any differences between the 1978 and
the 1981 Agreements must be specifically set out elsewhere in
the Agreement,in Principle, or else they do not constitute a
part of the new Agreement.

The only clause of the Agreement in

Principle which could have added the notice obligation to Section

-2023 (A) is paragraph 3.

In that paragraph, the parties agreed

that the Basic Steel Industry Agreement dated April 15, 1980,
would be incorporated into the 1981 Agreement, as follows: "First
year Steel Industry changes shall be effective April 4, 1982...."
b) Second year Steel Industry changes shall be effective April
4, 1983... c) Third Year Steel Industry changes shall be effective October 4, 1983." And paragraph 8 states that "The foregoing constitutes a complete and final settlement of all matters
ii
pending before the parties. In summary, the Company contends
that if the Amendment to Section 23 (A) took effect at all, it
must have been as of 1982 since'

there was no agreement to

incorporate any part of the Basic Steel Agreement prior to 1982.
The Company rejects the Union's contention that although
wages and fringe benefits or other economic benefits were to
become effective in 1982, "non-economic" benefits, such as the
new provisions of Section 23 (A), were to become effective
immediately.

First, there is no evidence that any such distinc-

tion was made during the negotiations.

The parties intended

the term "first-year Steel Industry changes" to mean what it
says: it would encompass both "economic" and "non-economic"
changes.

Indeed, the Memorandum of Settlement Agreement supports

this reading, since it provides for 1982 effective dates for
changes in such non-economic benefits as Section XII (Adjustment
of Grievances) and Section XVIII (Safety and Health).

Since

these sections are as "non-economic" as Section 23 (A) and since
both parties concede that there was no discussion of the
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substance or effective dates of any of these provisions, it
would be irrational to provide different effective dates for
some of them.

Second, it is not at all clear that Section 23 (A)

is a "non-economic" clause in light of the fact that the Union
argues its breach should increase severance benefits by about
$500,000.

Third, the Agreement in Principle makes clear that if

non-economic changes were not to be effective in 1982, they were
14
never to be effective.
The Company also rejects the Union's reliance on the
Memorandum of Settlement Agreement to support an immediate
effective date for Section 23 (A).

The Company argues that the

Memorandum of Settlemert was intended to be a vehicle to translate the Agreement in Principle into a full printed contract.

It

was not intended to change the parties prior agreement as reflect
ed in the Agreement in Principle.

And the parties concede that

there were no negotiations during the time between the two
documents.

Thus, any differences in the two documents must be

resolved in favor of the Agreement in Principle.
the Memorandum of Settlement are mutual mistakes.

Any changes in
Accordingly,

the Memorandum of Settlement Agreement contained two clerical,
typographical errors.

First, a typist should have but didn't

14. The Company also relies on its own bargaining notes which
state that the Union proposed a (1) one year respite on wages
and benefits; and (2) full impact of Basic Steel Settlement
applied on dates in second and third year of Pullman Agreemen
This reflects that all of Basic Steel was intended to be
effective commencing the second year of the Pullman contract,
since wages and benefits are distinguished from the "full
impact."

-22type 1982 effective dates on amendments Section VI and Section
23 (A).

This argument is buttressed by the fact that the type

face of these amendments

is different from that used for the

other changes which did contain explicit 1982 effective dates.
These include the non-economic changes referred to previously.
Second, the punctuation of the duration clause was erroneously
altered.

In all previous contracts between the parties the

clause "except as otherwise provided herein" was preceded by a
semicolon and not a comma.

Thus, the punctuation clearly referred

only to future modifications of the Agreement.

(The Section is

entitled "Termination Date.") The substitution of a comma for
the semicolon in the language in the Memorandum of Settlement
Agreement erroneously appears to change the clause into providing
an effective date for each individual section which does not
explicitly contain its own.

Instead, the duration clause was

merely intended to contain a general effective date which was
designed only to show that the Agreement was the chronological
successor to the 1978 Agreement.

This interpretation is supported

by the fact that no change in the impact of language of this
Section was ever discussed during the negotiations.
Thus, the Company asserts that it is clear that the Union's
reliance on the Memorandum of Settlement is misplaced.

If the

document had actually gone to the printer, as was anticipated,
the galleys would have been proofed and the mutual mistakes would
15
have been corrected by the parties.

15. The Company also rejects the Union's contention that it
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Moreover, the Company argues that even if the amendment to
Section 23 (A) was to be effective on April 4, 1981, it is not
controlling in this situation.

The Company contends that since

its decision to permanently close PCW 1 and PCW 2 was made and
16
communicated to the Union before April 4, 1981
the 90-day and
30-day notice requirements are inapplicable, even though the
actual closure date was not fixed until February 3, 1982.

The

Company relies on a prior decision by Arbitrator Dybeck in an
arbitration involving a clause containing identical language in
an agreement between United States Steel and the Steelworkers.
In that arbitration, United States Steel decided to permanently
close its Youngstown facilities and so informed the Union before
the advance notice provision became effective.

One of the

facilities was not, however, permanently closed and its employees
terminated until after the clause became effective.

Arbitrator

Dybeck held that the final closure after the effective date of
new contract was merely "the implementation of the earlier
decision." As such, the Company owed no duty to the Union under
the new provision.

The Company argues that the same result should

obtain to this case.

conceded the applicability of the second paragraph of 23 (A)
by the fact that it sent the February 3, 1982 telegram to the
Union and by the language of that telegram. The notice cannot
be grounds to hold the Company liable under a contract section
which was not in existence. In addition, even under the 1978
agreement Pullman was obligated at some point, to notify and
discuss the effects of plant closings with the Union.
16. The factual premises of the Company's argument that it previously made and communicated its decision are discussed in
detail later in this opinion.
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Compliance With The Notice Requirements
The Company argues that even if the Amendment to Section
23 (A) is effective on April 4, 1981

and applicable to its

actions herein it complied with the applicable 90 day written
notice provisions by sending the Union the text of the Company's
announcement of March 21, 1979.

That announcement

stated that

Pullman "approved a recommendation to withdraw from its rail
passenger car business as soon as practicable upon completion
of the contracts in process" and notes that the Company expects
"to record a charge for such withdrawal....(which) will include
....costs of closedown of fixed assets."

And the accompanying

letter to Mr. Coyne stated that the Company would be willing to
17
meet with the Union to discuss "any appropriate issues."
The
Company concedes that these documents did not constitute an unequivocal statement that Pullman was going to sell PCW 1 and PCW
2.

Indeed, they left open the possibility that Pullman would

use the assets in other operations.

The Company contends how-

ever, that Section 23 (A) requires that "Before the Company shall
finally decide to close permanently a plant it shall give the
Union, when practicable, advance written notification of its
intention."

17.

This is precisely what the Company did.

To notify

The Company also relies on the footnote in the 1979 Annual
report which has bean noted previously. There is no proof
in the record, however, that the Union received the Annual
Report. Nor is there any proof the Union received the
minutes of the Board of Director's meeting of March 21, 1979
or the estimates of shutdown costs prepared by Mr. Stanek.
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the Union only after it made a final decision would defeat the
purposes of the Section which was to allow the Union an opportunity to participate in the decision making process.
The Company also asserts that the evidence demonstrates
that during the period of 1979-1981 the Union knew the plants
18
would be closed.
Although Pullman concedes it considered variou
options which would keep the plants open, these were

"speculative

at best."
The Company rejects the Union's contention that any decision
to permanently close the plants was rescinded in late 1980 and
early 1981 when Wheelabrator publically announced that it was
reviewing the status of the passenger car manufacturing business
and President Begel so stated to the Union negotiating team.

The

Company characterized this evidence as reflecting only that the
Company considered reversing the earlier decision to permanently
close PCW 1 and PCW 2.

That characterization is supported by

the language in the November, 1981 Preliminary Prospectus which
stated that the Company was considering "whether to enter the
rail passenger car business that was discontinued by Pullman in
1979."

Nor did the negotiations from September through December,

1981 relating to the New York City order indicate any rescission

18. It points, in particular, to Mr. Gorski's testimony that he
so informed Mr. Coyne in February, 1981 and the various newspaper articles discussed previously in this opinion.
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of the prior decision.

It too merely reflected the Company's

willingness to consider reversing its closure decision.

Indeed,

these negotiations gave the Union the opportunity contemplated
by Section 23 (A) to bargain and make concessions to persuade
the Company to reverse its previously stated intent to close
the plants.

Thus, the full letter and the spirit of the amend-

ment to Section 23 (A) were met by these negotiations.
The Company also rejects the Union's argument that the
failure to exclude PCW 1 and PCW 2 in the April 1981 collective
bargaining agreement establishes that no decision had then been
19
made or notification given to permanently close the plants.
The
Company explains that PCW 1 and PCW 2 were not excluded because:
(1) the plants had not yet been "permanently" closed and the
employees severed, as was the case at the Hammond and Bessemer
plants and (2) the Company was afraid of aggravating sabotage,
slowdowns and the dissipation of the workforce prior to the
20
completion of the remaining work at the plants.
The Company further claims that it also complied with that
part of the second paragraph of Section XXIII A which provides
"Upon conclusion of such meetings, which in no event shall be
less than 30 days prior to the proposed closure, the Company

19.

As noted previously, the Bessemer and Hammond freight parts
plants which the Company had previously decided to permanently close were not included in the new agreement.

20.

There is no evidence in the record indicating that production work at PCW 2 continued after March 1981. Work did
continue at PCW 1 until the end of May 1981.

-27shall advise the Union of its final decision."

First, the

Company argues that this notice provision relates only to the
actual physical closure of the plants.

The Company asserts it

can begin to terminate the employees once it has decided to
permanently close the plants, but it cannot actually close them
until 30 days after it advised the Union of that decision.

If

an employer had to carry its entire workforce while it attempted
to dispose of assets or while finishing up small jobs it would
unduly hinder an employer in its right to dispose of those
assets.

Every passing day would cost it an enormous amount of

money in employee benefits even though it received no work or
productivity from them.

Similarly, the Company argues, that

the 30-day notice requirement relates to the actual plant closure
and not to the termination of employees.

The February 3, 1982

telegram advised the Union of the final decision to close and
the plants were not physically closed until more than thirty
days thereafter.

The employees could be terminated, and their

accrual of severance benefits halted, however, on the date the
telegram was sent.

To read the 30 day notice provision differ-

ently would, contrary to the express language of Section 23 (A),
offset the Company's right to reduce the work force.
Second, the Company asserts that it did indeed advise the
Union in December, 1981 of the final decision to permanently
close the plants.

It notes that no formal or written notice is

required by the 30-day provision of Section 23 (A).

The Company

claims that the Union knew the plants would be closed unless the
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New York City order could be obtained.

Thus, when the concession

negotiations with the Union broke off, the Union was advised that
the plants would be permanently closed.
Third, the Company argues that it was not "practicable"
for the Company to give the Union any public or formal notice
of its decisions or intentions after the talks broke off in
December, 1981 until February 3, 1982.

That is so because the

prospectus filed with the SEC on November 22, 1981 stated that
Pullman was considering entering the "rail passenger car business
that was discontinued by Pullman in 1979."

To announce publicly

that the possibility no longer existed because of the breakdown
of the negotiations in December, 1981 would impair the Company's
credibility with the SEC and perhaps would have violated the
federal securities laws. The announcement could not have been
made until an amended prospectus was filed.

That was done on

February 3, 1982 and on that date the telegram to the Union was
sent.
The Appropriateness of the Remedy
Lastly, the Company asserts that even if it violated Sectio
23 (A) the breach was only a technical one and the Union should
not be awarded monetary damages.

The Company emphasizes that

neither the Union nor individual employees were in any way
damaged or injured by reason of these events.

The Union and the

employees knew for more than two years that the plants would be
permanently closed unless something unusual occured which would
change that decision.

The Union was given the opportunity to

-29negotiate with the Company and make significant concessions in
order to keep the plants open when the Company considered bidding
on the New York order.

Thus, the Company satisfied the basic

purposes of Section 23 (A).
Moreover, granting monetary damages to the Union for the
Company's violation of Section 23 (A) would make the clause an
"economic" one, rather than a "non-economic" benefit as the Union
has characterized it.

Indeed, to interpret the section to man-

date a ninety-day waiting period during which time additional
severance benefits accrued would be contrary to the express
language in that provision which states "This notification provision shall not be interpreted to offset the Company's right to
lay off or in any other way reduce or increase the working force.
Thus, the Company argues that Section 23 should be interpreted
to permit the Company to termina te employees at the time it gives
the ninety days notice of permanent closure.

Once the notice is

given, the employees then have ninety days to elect under Section
23 (F) whether to receive severance benefits or be placed on
lay off status.

This interpretation would preserve the Company's

right to reduce its work force without unnecessary cost, give
the Union an opportunity to change the Company's decision during
the negotiations following the receipt of the notice, and permit
the employees to elect layoff

or severance depending on their

view of the negotiations between the Company and the Union.

In-

deed, the employees need make no decision until the negotiations
are actually completed.

-30THE UNION
The Union asserts that the Company's actions violated the
plain language of Section 23 (A) of the 1981 Collective Bargaining Agreement.

On February 3, 1982 the Company announced a

permanent closing effective that day.

As a result, the Company

terminated the employees effective that day.

That conduct vio-

lated Section 23 (A) of the 1981 Collective Bargaining Agreement
which requires that the Company "shall give the Union....advance
written notification of its intention....at least 90 days prior
to the proposed closure date."

Prior to February 3, 1982 the

Company had never notified the Union in writing or otherwise
that it intended to close these plants permanently within the
21
meaning of Section 23.
The Applicability of the Notice Provisions
The Union argues that the express, unambiguous language of
the Memorandum of Settlement Agreement establishes that the
notice provisions of Section 23 (A) became effective on April 4,
22
1981.
The Memorandum of Settlement Agreement was conceded by
the Company's chief negotiator in his testimony in this proceeding to be the document that "governed relations between the

21.

The Union has not specifically argued that the Company also
violated the 30 day notice provision in Section 23 (A).
However, that contention is included implicitly in the Union's
assertion that it received no notice of permanent closure
before February 3, 1982.

22.

The Union also contends that the Company waived any defense
as to the effective date since no such issue was raised by
the Company in its letter of April 6, 1982 rejecting the
instant grievance.

-31Company and the Union" at the time of the events in question.
It was read and signed by both parties.
by the Company.

Indeed, it was drafted

The Memorandum of Settlement Agreement is dated

"April 8, 1981" and states that the parties "agree(d) that the
following revisions and amendments shall be effective as provided herein and shall be promptly incorporated with the terms
and conditions of the respective Agreements effected, which
Agreements shall otherwise in all respects continue in effect....
Page two provides that "all changes as to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment and other conditions of employment in the
Labor Agreement between the parties dated April 4, 1978, (effective April 4, 1978), shall be as described in Exhibit A and said
Agreement as to or so changed will be identified as the Labor
Agreement of April 8, 1981, and so dated."

And the final page

of Exhibit A states: "This Agreement of April 8, 1981, effective
April 4, 1981, except as otherwise provided herein."

Thus the

Labor Agreement as a whole was effective April 4, 1981 and that
is the effective date for each duration provision of Exhibit A
unless another date is expressly indicated.

Although other

sections provide for 1982 or other specific effective dates, the
amendment to Section 23 (A) does not.
23
become effective on April 4, 1981.

23.

It must, therefore, have

The Union notes that even if there was an error in punctuation in the duration provision on the final page of the Memo
randum, the effective date of April 4, 1981 would be unchanged. Thus, even if the comma before the "except as other
wise provided" should have been a semi-colon, the provision
should be read as if it stated "This Agreement of April 8,
1981, (is) effective April 4, 1981; except as otherwise provided herein (it) shall continue in effect subject to the
following provisions."
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The Union rejects the Company's contention that the Memorandum of Settlement Agreement, as written, does not accurately
reflect the parties' agreement.

The Union argues that the

Company has not proved that there was any mistake at all in the
language of the Agreement.

At the very least, the Company has

not proved that the Union understood the effective date of
Section 23 (A) to be other than April 4, 1981.

Thus any mistake

in the unambiguous language of Section 23 (A) was not mutual.
Accordingly, the contract cannot be reformed and the parties are
bound by its plain and unambiguous language.

First, the Union

notes the "implausibility" of any mistake in the drafting of the
Memorandum of Settlement Agreement.

It was prepared by the

Company's labor relations staff, under the supervision of its
chief negotiator.

Its importance was clear, and the Company was

careful to make appropriate detailed word changes from the provisions of the Basic Steel Agreement.

Moreover, deferred effec-

tive dates were expressly provided for other provisions.
Second, the Company's telegram of February 3, 1982 reflects
its own understanding that the Amendment to Section 23 (A) was
then effective.

That telegram stated that notice was being given

"pursuant to Section 23, subsection A of the Collective Bargaining Agreement...dated April 8, 1981."

And the language of the

telegram paraphrases the language in the amendment wherein it
states the Company's "intention to permanently close" the plants
and the Company's willingness "to meet with you and discuss this
24
matter."

24.

The Union also relies on the absence of any such defense in
the Company's letter of April 6, 1982.

-33-

Third, the Union asserts that the evidence of the negotiations demonstrates that the parties intended an immediate
effective date for Section 23 (A).

In any event, it does not

satisfy the Company's burden of proving that the Memorandum misstates the parties intentions.

Thus, although the effective

date of Section 23 (A) was never discussed during the 1981 negotiations, the issue of a one year respite on some benefits was
the subject of intensive negotiations.

However, the respite or

deferrment dealt only with wages and fringe benefits in order to
accommodate the Company's "poor cash position."

Thus, the

Company's own bargaining notes reflect a "One-year respite on
wages and benefits."

The next paragraph of those notes states

"Full impact of Basic Steel Agreement applied on appropriate
dates in second and third years of agreement."

That reflects

the Union's proposal to compress the three years of wage and
fringe increases in the Basic Steel Agreement, into the last two
years of the Pullman Agreement.

However, the Union never pro-

posed to defer anything other than wages and benefits; noneconomic items were not even discussed.
for deferring non-economic

And there was no rationale

benefits, as such action would have hac

no impact on the Company's poor cash flow position.
Fourth, the Agreement in Principle does not support the
Company's position.

It is not a full-fledged contract.

By its

terms it covers "the main points of this agreement" and provides
that "the details of the agreement shall be reduced to writing
in a timely fashion."

Not only did the parties do just that in

-34signing the Memorandum of Settlement Agreement, but that document
covered many points that were not adverted to in the "Agreement
in Principle."

In addition, the language of the Agreement in

Principle does not establish a deferred effective date for anything other than wage and benefits.

"First year Steel Industry

changes" meant only wages and fringes, since those were the only
terms or conditions which were to undergo changes in one year
intervals in the Basic Steel Agreement.

The Memorandum of

Settlement adopted this three tiered approach to wages and benefits.

The fact that the Memorandum provides different effective

dates for two "non-economic" provisions does not justify giving
a tortured reading to the phrase "first-year changes" in the
Agreement in Principle and thereby ignoring the plain language of
the Memorandum of Settlement Agreement with respect to the effective date of Section 23 (A).
Thus, Mr. Gorski's testimony to the effect that the effective date of Section 23 (A) was intended to be April 4, 1982 and
that the failure to explicitly so provide was a "clerical oversight" is not credible as a statement of the Company's intent
much less as a statement of the Union's intent.

This is espe-

cially so since the Company did not produce any documents that
demonstrate the typist was instructed to type in a 1982 effective
date.

Nor did the person in charge of overseeing the preparation
25
of the Memorandum testify for the Company.

25.

The Union also relies on the fact the same typist who added
different effective dates for two non-economic clauses did
not do so for a third such clause, i.e. Section 15 which
deals with vacations.
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negotiators clearly understood the agreement to provide for a
new contract effective in April, 1981 with a one year respite on
wages and fringes.

The Union negotiators so testified and the

Company offered no contrary evidence as to the Union's under26
standing.
Thus, any mistake is not mutual and was due to the
Company's own error in drafting.

Accordingly, this Arbitrator

cannot "rewrite" or reform the plain words of the Memorandum of
27
Settlement Agreement.
Compliance With The Notice Requirements
The Union argues that the evidence conclusively demonstrates
that at no time prior to February 3, 1982 was the Union notified,
in writing or otherwise, of the Company's intention to permanent28
ly close PCW 1 and PCW 2.
The Union notes that the Company's
press release of March 21, 1979, its letter to all passenger

26.

The Union also contends that it is "highly unlikely" they
would have agreed to a different effective date for Section
23 (A) if it had been discussed, given the prominence of
the plant closing issue.

27.

The Union also rejects the Company's defense that the 90 day
notice provision in amended Section 23 (A) does not apply to
the actions at issue herein because the Company had made the
decision to permanently close PCW 1 and PCW 2, and so notified the Union before April 4, 1981. First, the Union argue
that this defense has been waived since it was not raised
previously in the grievance process. Second, the Union contends that the Company did not in fact make a decision to
close the plants or communicate that decision to the Union
before April 4, 1981.
The factual premises for this contention are discussed infra.

28.

The Union also argues that the Company's defense of prior
notice has been waived by its failure to raise it during
earlier steps in the grievance process.
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unit employees of that date and its 1979 Annual Report expressly
contemplated that the plants might continue in operation.

At

the very least, these documents indicate that the Company had not
yet made a decision on the issue of permanent closure of the
plants.

At most, the Company announced a decision to withdraw
29
from the passenger car business.
The Company produced no evidence that it gave any such

notice between March 1979 and October 1980.

The fact that

various local union officials attempted to exert political and
other community pressures in the hope that the Company would
continue producing passenger cars at PCW 1 and PCW 2, does not
mean that the Company had made a shut down decision or that the
Union knew about it.

Local union officials knew no more than

they were told by the Company.

And a Company witness conceded

that the Company's position remained unchanged during this period
Obviously, the public statements reflected only that local union
officials knew the plants might close.

Moreover, these state-

ments were not made by any authorized Union representative on
plant shutdown matters and did not reflect official Union
positions.
In any event, in the latter part of 1980, the Chairman of

29.

The Union notes that no evidence was produced tending to
show it ever received a copy of the minutes of the Pullman
Board of Directors' meeting of March 21, 1979. In addition,
those minutes are ambiguous as to whether the Board actually
endorsed a shutdown of the plants. Such an interpretation
of those minutes would be inconsistent with the Company's
other public announcement to the effect that it was consider
ing alternative uses for the plants.
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Wheelabrator-Frye, the company which had acquired Pullman,
stated that all options relative to Pullman would be re-examined,
including specifically the announced decision to withdraw from
the passenger car manufacturing business.

This approach was

confirmed in a newspaper article in November, 1980 and a statement made by Pullman's President, Mr. Begel, to the Union's
negotiating team in March of 1981.

And the Company did not offer

any persuasive evidence to rebut the Union's position.

The only

testimony offered by the Company relative to this time period
was that of Mr. Gorski who testified that he met with Mr. Coyne
in February 1981 and had nothing encouraging to offer respecting
future passenger car production.

However, Mr. Gorski admitted

he was expressing his own and not an official company position.
In addition, Gorski's meeting preceeded President Begel's statement to the Union's negotiating committee.

And during the 1981

contract negotiations, Mr. Gorski himself stated to the Union
that the issue was still under review.
Further the Union argues that the fact that PCW 1 and PCW
2 were included within the scope of the April, 1981 collective
bargaining agreement conclusively demonstrates that the Company
had made no prior decision to permanently close these plants and
that the Union had no notice of any such action.

This is so be-

cause two other plants, Hammond and Bessemer freight parts, were
specifically excluded because the Company had already decided,
before the negotiations began, to close them permanently.

Indeed

the work of the Hammond plant, like that at PCW 2, was expected
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to be completed about eight weeks after the new agreement was
executed.

The work at PCW 2 was already completed by the end

of March, 1981.
From September to December, 1981 the parties conducted
new bargaining for a new agreement at PCW 1 and PCW 2.

The

Company never notified the Union during these negotiations that
the plants were to be permanently closed, even if no agreement
was actually reached with respect to the New York order.

Not

only does the evidence fail to demonstrate that any such notice
was given, but there is affirmative proof indicating that
Pullman was still, and would continue to be interested in the
possibility of other future passenger car production business.
The Union relies on the statement made by President Begel to the
Union, and the President's letter to Congressman Benjamin in
October, 1981, as well as Mr. Flower's letter to the Congressman.
Even when the talks broke off, the Company did not advise the
Union of a decision to permanently close the plants.

And the

testimony demonstrates that the Union did not believe that the
Company was retreating from its expressed interest in the passenger car business.
The Union also rejects the Company's argument that it failed to comply with the notice provisions because it was "impracticable" to do so.

The Union notes that the Company's defense

is based upon the fact that it had filed a prospectus with the
SEC in November, 1981 which stated that "Pullman Standard is
currently considering whether to enter the rail passenger car
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business that was discontinued by Pullman in 1979." According
to the Company, to thereafter announce publicly

that it was no

longer considering such action would have hurt the Company's
credibility with the SEC.

The Union argues that such a public

announcement, based on events occurring subsequent to the filing
of the registration statement, would not have impeached the
Company's credibility.

Indeed, a public announcement by the

Company of its changed intention would have helped insulate it
from allegations that it intended to mislead investors.

And,

in any event, there was no evidence demonstrating any reason
why the Company did not immediately file an amended statement
with the SEC as soon as the decision was allegedly made in
December,

1981.
The Appropriateness of the Remedy

Lastly, the Union argues against the Company's contention
that the Union suffered no damages as a result of any violation
of Section 23 (A) and that no monetary remedy should be granted.
Rather the Union asserts that it is entitled to the following
award:
"A permanent shutdown of the Company's passenger car plants within the meaning of Section
23 did not occur until May 4, 1982 - ninety
(90) days following the written notice of
intention to close these plants given by the
Company to the Union on February 3, 1982 - and
all rights of employees that turn on the date
of permanent shutdown shall be determined on
the basis of a May 4, 1982 shutdown date."
Accordingly, the Union argues that severance entitlements, which
are determined as of the date of termination, should be
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calculated from May 4, 1982, rather than February 3, 1982 which
is the date the Company has thus far relied upon.
The Union resists the Company's contention that the
negotiations in the fall of 1981 relating to the New York order
satisfied the purpose of the 90 day notice requirement of
Section 23 (A).

First, the Union asserts that the evidence

establishes that the requirement in question has two purposes:
(1) to give the Union an opportunity to talk with the Company
to determine whether the Union can make concessions or facilitate
other arrangements that would modify the Company's thinking; and
(2) to afford the Union an opportunity for timely discussions
concerning the effects of such a shutdown, enabling the parties
to resolve questions concerning pension and insurance distribution, to apprise employees of their shutdown benefits, and to
attempt to secure alternative job placements for employees about
to be terminated.

Obviously, the second purpose (the "effects"

bargaining and notice) could not have been satisfied through
the negotiations which occurred during the fall of 1981.

Indeed,

the Union argues that the first purpose was neither attempted nor
accomplished.

This is so because, although the actual bargain-

ing focused on the New York order, the Union was led to believe
that the Company was interested in pursuing other orders as well.
And the Union was never even notified that if a bid was not made
on the New York order, the plants would be permanently closed.
Accordingly, the Union did not seek financial data to determine
the necessity of the shutdown or inform its membership and afford
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Most importantly, the Union's

bargaining posture might well have been different if they knew
the consequence of a failure to reach agreement would be a
permanent closure.
The Union rejects the Company's position that the 90-day
notice provisions of Section 23 (A) is only intended to trigger,
and should therefore run concurrently with the 90-day election
period of Section 23 (F).

The latter section only permits an

employee to elect lay off status after he "would otherwise have
been terminated...under the circumstances specified in Section
23 (A)." And, under Section 23 (A), the employees termination which itself "result(s)" from a plant closure - can take place
only after the Union has received written notice of the "intention" to close permanently and at least 90 days have elapsed.
Thus, it is untenable to maintain that the notice period preceding plant shutdown should be identical to the election period
that follows the termination resulting from the shutdown.

In

addition, the Company's interpretation would undermine the
purpose
of the 90-day notice provision in that it would require
"
employees to make elections at the very time that negotiations
are taking place in an effort to keep the plants open.

And the

discussions on the "effects" issues would be disrupted.
Similarly

unpersuasive is the Company's argument that

Section 23 (A) should not be applied to confer economic benefits
because it has been characterized as a "non-economic" provision.
The breaches of many "non-economic provisions" have economic
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effects.

Moreover, the notice provisions appear in a section

entitled "Severance Allowance" and subsection A is entitled
"Conditions of Allowance."
Lastly, this Arbitrator should reject the Company's
attempt to escape the force of the remedy on the basis of
"equity." Even if those employees who were hired between February
3, 1979 and May 4, 1979 "never worked for three years" and were
advised that the Company had decided to discontinue passenger
30
car production and that continued employment was not guaranteed,
were hired pursuant to the same Union contract as other bargaining unit members.

The Company never attempted to negotiate any

special arrangement with the Union.

Nor did these employees

have any more notice than others that the plants would be
permanently closed and they would be terminated.

In any event,

the Arbitrator's authority is confined to interpreting and
applying the language of the Agreement, whatever his view of
"equities" may be.

30.

The Company, however, did not announce publicly its
withdrawal from the passenger car business until
March 21, 1979.

-43-

OPINION

A review of more than 580 pages of transcript, forty-three
exhibits and the excellent briefs filed by counsel for both sides
persuades me that the critical notice provision was probably not
mutually intended to be effective at the time of the plant closings at issue; but, assuming arguendo its effectiveness, its
purpose and intent were substantially and constructively met,
thereby mandating a denial of the grievance.
For completeness I shall discuss both, alternative
conclusions.

In late March of 1979, the Company notified the Union that
it had decided to withdraw from the passenger car business then
being conducted at PCW 1 and PCW 2 as soon as practicable upon
the completion of the work in progress.

It also notified the

Union that it expected to record a charge for that withdrawal
which would include the costs of "closedown of fixed assets."
The Company expressed its willingness to discuss any appropriate
issues with the Union.

The Company did then notify all of its

employees that ''no final decision has been made with respect to
the ultimate disposition of the physical assets" and emphasized
the possibility of putting the plants to alternative uses.

None-

theless, the most reasonable interpretation of the Company's
statements was that since the Company had decided to withdraw
from the business being conducted at the plants, they would be
closed at some future time unless some new circumstance or
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development called for a change in direction.

In short, the

Union was put on notice that there was a substantial probability
of permanent closure.
The evidence of the events between March, 1979 and
February, 1982 confirms this view of the Company's actions and
the Union's understanding.

Thus, subsequent to April, 1979 the

Union attempted to exert political and community pressures to
avoid the shutting down of, and loss of jobs at the plants.
Obviously, those activities reflected a concern that there was
a significant risk of such consequences.

Although Mr. Bowman

may not have had authority to negotiate or bind the Union with
respect to plant shutdowns, as President of the affected Local
his statements are relevant in determining the Union's state of
knowledge.

Even though the Company did continue to consider

other options for the plants, there is no evidence to indicate
that the prospects of closure became only possible or speculative
rather than probable.
Similarly, Wheelabrator-Frye's consideration of reversing
the prior decision did not constitute any actual significant
change in the Company's prior position.

Rather, that review was

consistent with the Company's desire to explore possible ways to
avoid the probability of permanent closure.

Neither this review

nor any statements made by Mr. Begel to the Union negotiators
gave the Union any reason to believe that its prior concern over
permanent plant closure and the resulting job losses was less
compelling.
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A more troubling matter to the Company's position is the
fact that the 1981 Collective Bargaining Agreement did not exclude PCW 1 and PCW 2 although it did exclude the Hammond and
Bessemer plants.

The latter were excluded because before the

start of negotiations the Company had permanently closed one and
finally decided to permanently close the other.

The Union argues

the inclusion of PCW 1 and PCW 2 in the new agreement demonstrates it was not on notice that these plants would be permanently closed.

However, the Company has offered a plausible and

relevant explanation for the distinction between these plants
32
and the Bessemer and Hammond plants.
That is, the Company had
decided finally to permanently close these plants and terminate
the employees; it had not exhausted alternative consideration of
possible alternative options with respect to PCW 1 and PCW 2.

In

addition, the events which transpired after the new agreement was
executed should have dispelled any notion that the Company's
position had been altered just by the fact that PCW 1 and PCW 2
continued to be included in the process of negotiating collective bargaining agreements.
plants.

No new orders were accepted at the

All production activity ceased at PCW 1 at the end of

March, 1981 and at PCW 2 at the end of May or beginning of June

32.

The Company also contends that it did not exclude PCW 1 and
PCW 2 because it was afraid of aggravating sabotage, slowdowns and the disruption of the workforce prior to the
completion of the remaining work at these plants. There is
no evidence tending to establish that the Union knew or
should have known these motives. Hence, this explanation is
irrelevant to any issue regarding the nature of the notice
given to the Union.
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of 1981.

Thus, almost all of the Union employees ceased working

at these plants almost immediately after the execution of the
new collective bargaining agreement.
Similarly, the negotiations between the Company and the
Union relating to the New York bid gave the Union no justifiable
reason to believe that the Company had changed its prior position
Again, the Company's actions, the statements made by Mr. Begel
to the Union negotiators and to Congressman Benjamin and the
statement made in the SEC Prospectus, merely reflected the
Company's willingness to consider possible alternatives to
permanent closure.

Indeed, during those negotiations, the plants

continued to remain inoperative in fact.

And when those detailed

and extensive negotiations broke off early December, 1981 the
Union should have known that the most likely of the possible
alternatives to permanent closure had not materialized.

Further,

these negotiations afforded the Union the opportunity to persuade
the Company to change its decision to take such action as would
result in the permanent closure of PCW 1 and PCW 2.
Section 23 (A) provides that: "Before the Company shall
finally decide to close permanently a plant...it shall give the
Union, when practical, advance written notification of its
intention...at least 90 days prior to the proposed closure date,
and the Company will thereafter meet with the appropriate Union
representatives in order to provide them with an opportunity to
33
discuss the Company's proposed course of action."
The purposes
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of this provision are to: (1) give the Union an opportunity to
talk with the Company to determine whether the Union can make
concessions or facilitate other arrangements that would modify
the Company's thinking and (2) afford the Union an opportunity
for timely discussion concerning the effects of such a shutdown,
enabling the parties to resolve questions concerning pension and
insurance matters, apprise employees of shutdown benefits and
help set up alternative job placement.

The evidence establishes

that beginning in March, 1979 and continuing through February 3,
1982 the Company gave the Union notice, in writing, orally and
through circumstance, that PCW 1 and PCW 2 would permanently close
unless unusual circumstances intervened.

Admittedly, the Company

did not notify the Union, in writing, until February 3, 1982,
that it had finally closed the plants and that alternatives to
closure were no longer under consideration.

Arguably, such a

failure might constitute a technical breach of Section 23 (A).
However, before that final decision was made the Company put the
Union on enough notice to constructively

satisfy the spirit or

purposes of Section 23 (A).
The Union was or should have been concerned enough with
the probability of job terminations to undertake whatever action

33.

The express language of Section 23 (A) does not require that
the Company notify the Union of a specific closing date. It
only requires notice at least 90 days prior to the proposed
closure date. Thus, notice that sometime after 90 days the
plants would close would appear to satisfy the contractual
language.
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it could to forestall that eventuality.

Indeed, the negotiations

on the New York bid which occurred in late 1981 provided the
substantial equivalent of the opportunity for discussion which
34
is contemplated by Section 23 (A).
And "effects" bargaining
or calculations and notice to employees and efforts at alternative job placements should have taken place after these negotiations broke-off, and perhaps even earlier (e.g. when all production at the plants stopped) in light of the Union's knowledge of
the probability of job termination.

Further, the breakdown of

the New York bid negotiations should have put the Union on notice
that permanent closure was virtually inevitable.

Thus, it con-

stituted a substantial equivalent of "advising the Union of its
35
final decision."
The Union has not established that it suffered any tangible
injury from any failure by the Company to comply with the letter
of Section 23 (A).

Rather, the evidence demonstrates that the

Company has complied with the spirit of this provision.

In such

cirumstances a technical breach will be excused to avoid a disproportionate forfeiture.

See e.g. Delaware Steel Co. v. Caiman

Steamship Corp., 378 F 2d 386 (3d Cir. 1967); RESTATEMENT OF THE

34.

The Union's argument that its approach and bargaining posure might have been different if it knew that permanent
closure would result from a failure to reach agreement is
speculative and unsupported by any concrete evidence.

35.

Thus, I need not and do not decide whether the 30-day notice
provision relates only to the actual physical closure of the
plant or to employee terminations as well.
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LAW SECOND, CONTRACTS 2d § 229 (ALI 1979).
It has been repeatedly held and well settled that bare facts
may not be within the precise letter of the contract, but still
meet the test of the contract's purpose and intent.

That is what

we have in this case.
As originally stated, the foregoing analysis assumes the
applicability of the notice requirements of Section 23 (A) at the
time of the events in question and concludes that the Union has
not proved a material breach by the Company.

Of course, that

conclusion alone would be sufficient to support a finding in
favor of the Company.

But an analysis of the question of appli-

cability also results in the dismissal of the grievance.
I am persuaded of the probability that both parties agreed
to an April, 1982 effective date for the second paragraph of
37
Section 23 (A).
Accordingly, the provision of the Memorandum

36.

The Company's argument that further notice was not "practicable" is not persuasive for the reasons set forth by the
Union. However, as I have concluded that the notice which
was given was substantially sufficient, the result is not
affected by the rejection of this contention.

37.

The Union's argument that the Company has waived this "defense" is without merit. See note 32 Supra. In addition,
the Company's telegram of February 3, 1982 does not constitute an admission of the applicability of the notice
provision of Section 23 (A). A decision to give notice
under these circumstances should not be construed as a
concession of contractual duty, rather than as a voluntary
act. To decide otherwise would be to punish the Company for
notifying the Union of its intentions. Nor should a decision to cover "all the bases" prevent a party from later
asserting a legal position that all of its prior acts were
not obligatory.
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of Settlement Agreement which indicates a 1981 effective date of
that Section reflects a mutual mistake of both parties.

It is

well settled that in such situations, the writing should be reformed to express the actual agreement.

See, e.g. Davenport v.

Beck, 576 P. 2d 1199 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977); Olds v. Jamison,
195 Neb. 388, 238 N.W. 2d 459 (1976); Parrish v. City of
Carbondale, 61 111. App. 3d 500, 18 111. Dec. 779, 378 NE 2d 243
(1978); RESTATEMENT OF LAW SECOND, CONTRACTS 2 d § 155 (ALI 19).
At the very least, the Company has established that it was mistaken in its belief that the Memorandum of Settlement reflected
a later effective date for Section 23 (A) than that actually
provided by the document and that the Union had reason to know
of the Company's mistake.

Even in such situations of "unilateral1

mistake, the contract should be reformed.

See C.N. Monroe Mfg.

Co. v. United States, 143 Supp 449 (E.D. Mich 1956); Kenneth E.
Curron, Inc. v. State, 106 N.H. 558, 215 A.2d 702 (1965); Chernick
v. United States 372 F.2d 492 (Ct. 1967); RESTATEMENT OF LAW
SECOND, CONTRACTS 2d, § 153 (ALI 1979).

And even the Company's

alleged negligent failure to correct or discover the mistake
does not preclude reformation.

See Collins v. Parkinson, 98

Idaho 871, 547 p.2d 913 (1978); Cox v. Hall, 54 Mont. 154, 168
P. 519 (1917); RESTATEMENT OF LAW SECOND, CONTRACTS 2d, § 157
(ALI 1979).
The plain and unambiguous language of the Agreement in
Principle indicates that except as otherwise specified, the
parties agreed to an April, 1982 effective date for all first
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year changes in the 1980 Basic Steel Agreement which were to be
incorporated into the Pullman Agreement.

The notice provisions

set forth in the amendment to Section 23 (A) was one of those
38
first-year changes. There is simply no provision in the Agreement
in Principle which could be read to provide for an immediate
effective date for any such provision.

Indeed, as the Company

points out, if the amendment to Section 23 (A) was not to become
effective in 1982, it would not be part of the Agreement between
the parties at all.

And paragraph 8 of the Agreement in

Principle states that "the foregoing constitutes a complete and
final settlement of all matters pending before the parties."
The only contrary arguments with respect to the language
of the Agreement in Principle are: (1) that this document was not
intended to cover the substantive provisions of 23 (A) because
it was not a "main point of this Agreement" and/or (2) the
document did not purport to deal with the effective date because
it was only a "detail(s)" which was to be "reduced to writing in
a timely fashion."

Neither argument is persuasive.

To accept

the first would be to conclude that all changes, except for
salary and fringes, in the 1980 Steel Industry Agreement were

38.

The ordinary meaning of the words "first-year changes" is
those additions or modifications which were to become effective immediately in the 1980 Steel Industry Agreement. The
Union's argument that "first-year changes" includes only
those provisions which were also to change in the second
and third years (i.e. wages and fringes) is not persuasive.
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"minor" points.

Such an assumption is simply unfounded in

general and is unsupported by any evidence in this proceeding.
The Union's second argument is contradicted by the fact that the
Memorandum of Settlement Agreement provides specific effective
dates for all the changes in the 1980 Steel Industry Agreement,
even though there were no discussions or negotiations between the
parties between the execution of the Agreement in Principle and
the execution of the Memorandum of Settlement.
Indeed, the strongest argument in favor of the Company's
position on this issue is that the Memorandum of Settlement
Agreement, the document upon which the Union relies, provides
April, 1982 effective dates for provisions relating to Adjustment
of Grievances (Section XII); Safety and Health (Section XVIII),
and Shift Differentials (Section X).

The only reasonable explana

tion for providing any effective dates for these sections is that
the parties so agreed in the Agreement in Principle.

And since

these clauses are as "non-economic" in purpose as the notice provisions of Section 23 (A), there would be no reason to provide an
earlier, 1981 effective date for the latter provision.

Thus, the

Union's argument that only "economic" provisions were to be deferred, is not persuasive.

Nor was any evidence introduced in

this proceeding which affirmatively supports such a distinction.
The record indicates that neither side discussed the substance of
Section 23 (A), much less its effective date.
The testimony of Union witnesses that they "intended" all
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non-economic benefits to be effective immediately is purely conelusory.

There was simply no basis in the negotiations upon
39
which to draw such an inference.
And the conclusion is contradicted by the plain language of the Agreement in Principle.

It

is well settled that the purely subjective state of mind of one
party does not establish the intent of the parties for the purpose of interpreting their contract.
Thus, I conclude that the documents and testimony

indicate

that both parties intended to end their labor dispute by a oneyear extension of the basic terms of their 1978 Agreement.

Excep

for items not relevant to this decision, any changes, additions
and modifications to the 1978 Agreement, including the Amendment
to Section 23 (A), would be instituted one year thereafter.
Accordingly, any language to the contrary in the Memorandum of
40
Settlement does not reflect the actual agreement of the parties
41
and therefore constitutes mutual mistake.

39.

The fact that the Company's rationale for deferring wage and
fringe increases was its poor cash position, does not establish that other changes were not to be deferred. In any
event, requiring 90 days advance notice before the Company
could terminate employees and interrupt service for the
purpose of severance pay entitlement might well have economi
consequences.

40.

I accept the Union's argument that the language of the
Memorandum of Settlement provides for an immediate effective date for the notice provisions of Section 23 (A).

41.

This conclusion is corroborated by the fact that the type
face of Section 23 (A) and Section VI, neither of which
contained an explicit 1982 effective date, is different from
that used for other changes which specifically included
deferred effective dates. Thus it is reasonable to conclude
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For the reasons stated in this Opinion, the grievance is
42
denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: November 16, 1983

that a different typist erroneously failed to include the
appropriate effective dates in the former provisions. In
addition, the fact that the Memorandum of Settlement
Agreement was intended to be incorporated into a more
complete and final document satisfactorily answers the
Union's argument that any mistake would be "implausible."
In any event, I have been persuaded that a mistake was
indeed made.
42.

I need not and therefore do not make any decision with
respect to the Company's argument that the extension of
continuous service for the purpose of severance pay entitlement should never be an appropriate remedy for the
Company's failure to give timely notice pursuant to Section
23 (A) before terminating employees as a result of
permanent plant closures.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Rondout Valley Secretaries of
Roundout Teachers Association

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #19 39 0190 82

and
Rondout Valley Central School District

The stipulated issue is:
Did the District violate Section 5.7 of the
collective bargaining agreement when it denied religious leave with pay to grievants
Jacqueline Baxter and Helen Walker for
November 1, 1982 (Feast of All Saints) and
December 8, 1982 (Feast of the Immaculate
Conception)? If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the District in
Accord, New York on May 25, 1983 at which time the grievants
and representatives of the above named Association and District
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The parties filed post-hear-

ing briefs.
Section 5.7 of the contract reads:
Employees shall be entitled to religious
leave not to exceed three (3) days per
year. Such leave days shall be paid and
not chargeable to any employee leave
credits. Unused religious days shall not
accumulate with sick leave days at the end
of each school year.
The grievants are members of the Catholic faith.

There

is no dispute that the Feast of All Saints and the Feast of the
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Immaculate Conception are Catholic holy days and days of
obligation.
The grievants were denied leave with pay by the District
primarily on two grounds.

First, the religious obligations on

both holy days could be met by attending a single Mass, and
the grievants could have attended Mass either in the morning
before the work day began or in the evening after the work day
was completed.

Or in short, a full day of leave was not neces-

sary to meet the religious obligations of either holy day.
Second, the District claims that Section 5.7 was expressly
negotiated with the Association to apply to one and possibly
two Jewish employees and is applicable to the Jewish holy days
of Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashonah, both of which require full days
of observance.

At the hearing the District speculated that

there might be other employees whose religions require full
days of observance, under which Section 5.7 would be applicable,
but the District did not identify any such employees or the
holy days.
The untenability of the District's assertions is that
the contract clause, clear on its face, contains none of the
limiations, conditions, or specific application claimed.

It

does not limit its intent to religious days which require
observance of a full day.

It does not limit its application

to any specified groups or person(s).

Clearly, had the parties

intended to write a contract provision with such special and
limited application, they could and indeed should have done so

-3by side agreement and/or with explicit delineating language.
That they did not, but rather wrote a contract clause which
on its face and in its language is applicable to "employees"
generally, requires as a matter of. fundamental contract law,
general and unrestricted

application.

Also, the District's argument is barred by the parol
evidence rule.

That rule prohibits consideration of oral agree-

ments made prior to or at the same time as the written agreement,
if the effect would be to vary a written agreement that is
clear and unambiguous.

Such a proscribed variation is what

the District seeks in this arbitration.
Also, it seems to me that the District's

interpretation

and the result it advances in this arbitration would be
discriminatory and perhaps illegal.

It would provide days off

with pay for members of one religious groups and deny it to
others.

The contract language, to which the Arbitrator is

bound, does not support any such differentiation.
For the foregoing reasons the grievances are granted.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
h aving duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The District violated Section 5.7 of the
collective bargaining agreement when it
denied religious leave with pay to grievants Jacqueline Baxter and Helen Walker.
The grievants shall be paid for the religious days of November 1, 1982 (Feast
of All Saints) and December 8, 1982 (Feast
of the Immaculate Conception).

DATE: July 11, 1983

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

-4-

STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) ' "
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the indiri-dual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Paperworkers International
Union, AFL-CIO, Local 1482

OPINION AND AWARD
Grievance #555556
Case No. 81K/18997

and

Schweitzer Division of
Kimberly-Clark Corporation

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective bargaining agreement when it denied Grievance
No. 555556? If so, what shall the remedy be?
The grievance reads:
Shippers-Packers, Department of Shipping request increase in hourly rate.
Adjustment in rate desired due to:
increased work load
increased productivity
increased responsibility.
Considering the shipperfork-lift operation phase
of the job in itself merits
a rate increase. The present
rate is lower than prevailing
rates per hour.
Hearings were held on March 10, 1982 and March 3, 1983 at
which time representatives of the above named Union and Company
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The Union claims

that there have been substantial changes

in the duties and responsibilities of the shipper-packer job with
in the meaning and intent of Sections 6 and 15 of the contract,
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warranting an increase in the rate of pay.
At the first hearing, the Union set forth twelve changes
in the job as follows:
1. Help inspection department.
2. Weigh pallets for Supply Coordinator.
**3. Move many more pallets to make up
shipments.
4. Re-label many more pallets from a few,
in months before, to 72 and more in a
week.
5. Operate Fork-Lift much more than before
because of item #3, odd jobs, and reduction of 1 man.
6. Operate both ends of Stretch-Wrap machine 1 man instead of 2 men (4/9/79).
7. Operation of Stretch-Wrap without conveyor
by 1 man, instead of 2 men. Working of
machine, weighing, loading, unloading and
storing pallets.
8. Deliver samples (boxes on skids) to Stock
Room - other end of mill.
9. Short-cutting shipment checking - helps the
clerk, but at times puts more work on us.
Prevents delay of shipment.
10. Two (2) men handle the shipping, loading and
unloading of trailers. Three (3) men did the
job before.
11. Have responsibility that previously were that
of the foreman.
12. Do porter's work.
(Fork Lift operators at Philip Morris, unloading the pallets we load, get $8.75 per
hour, compared to the rate of $7.11 for the
Fork Lift operation and working at more than
one type of job.)
At the second hearing, the Union set forth additional
changes in the job dealing with the operation of the fork lift;
the handling of pallets, use of inspection sheets and other inspectional duties, the addition of the photo cell, the addition
of a stop button, jamming of the turntable, reduction of personne
utilization of the "small machine," loading of trucks, labeling,
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use of conversion tables and the performance of work previously
done by utility men.
The Union, and particularly the testimony of Walter Bonus,
have ably and persuasively established that the duties enumeratec
at the first and second hearings are now part of the shipperpacker job.

Also, the testimony and evidence indicate that all

or a significant number of those duties and responsibilities may
not have been part of the job or as demanding a part, when the
separate shipper and packer classifications were merged.
However the fatal flaw in the Union's case and in Mr.
Bonus' testimony is that the probative evidence shows that those
duties and responsibilities were in place as part of the job,
with the same magnitude, and were accounted for and accomodated
by and at the time of the settlement of grievance S-5 in July
1978, which increased the hourly rate of the shipper-packer job
by I0i.
That grievance settlement reads :
Management will give a 10^ per hour wage
adjustment to the shipper-packers for the
operation of the stretch wrap equipment
and the total responsibility for the package. This adjustment will be retroactive
to July 12, 1978. (emphasis added)
I am persuaded that the "total responsibility for the
package" was the subject of the subsequent meeting on March 9,
1979 between the Company and the Shipping Department employees,
and that the Company's minutes of that meeting (Company Exhibit
8) accurately reflect the discussion and the agreement on what

-4was expected of the shipper-packagers

for the

an hour rate

increase .
A review of those minutes show that the parties discussed
all or virtually all the duties and responsibilities which the
Union now claims are "changes" that post-dated that settlement.
I conclude therefore that the settlement of grievance S-5 and
the rate increase of 10(*f an hour were in consideration for the
performance by the shipper-packers of virtually all the duties
in contest in this arbitration.

And that therefore those duties

and responsibilities do not represent new or additional changes
justifying an additional rate increase.

I construe the Company's

third step answer settling grievance S-5, and particularly the
language "the total responsibility for the package," to encompass all the contested duties and responsibilities of the job in
"packaging" pallets and the product, not just handling the "wrap
equipment." If, as the Union claims, the 10^ increase was solely
because of new duties in handling the stretch wrap equipment,
the additional settlement language "and the total responsibility
for the package" would be unnecessary and meaningless.

I am

satisfied that that additional language has its own meaning, and
that it was meant and understood to apply to all the duties enumerated in the notes of the meeting of March 9,

1979.

As those duties and responsibilities fall with the "total"
job of "responsibility for the package" and as the Company paid
10^ an hour extra for the performance and assumption thereof by
the shipper-packers, those duties and responsibilities cannot

-5now be claimed as "changes" or "new" for another rate increase.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the collective bargaining agreement when it denied
grievance no. 555556.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 25, 1983
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Paperworkers International
Union, AFL-CIO, Local 1482

OPINION AND AWARD
Grievance if555556
Case No. 81K/18997

and
Schweitzer Division of
Kimberly-Clark Corporation

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective bargaining agreement when it denied Grievance
No. 555556? If so, what shall the remedy be?
The grievance reads:
Shippers-Packers, Department of Shipping request increase in hourly rate.
Adjustment in rate desired due to:
increased work load
increased productivity
increased responsibility.
Considering the shipperfork-lift operation phase
of the job in itself me fits
a rate increase. The present
rate is lower than prevailing
rates per hour.
Hearings were held on March 10, 1982 and March 3, 1983 at
which time representatives of the above named Union and Company
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

rlhe

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The Union claims

that there have been substantial changes

in the duties and responsibilities of the shipper-packer job within the meaning and intent of Sections 6 and 15 of the contract,
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warranting an increase in the rate of pay.
At the first hearing, the Union set forth twelve changes
in the job as follows:
1. Help inspection department.
2. Weigh pallets for Supply Coordinator.
**3. Move many more pallets to make up
shipments.
4. Re-label many more pallets from a few,
in months before, to 72 and more in a
week.
5. Operate Fork-Lift much more than before
because of item #3, odd jobs, and reduction of 1 man.
6. Operate both ends of Stretch-Wrap machine 1 man instead of 2 mefi (4/9/79).
7. Operation of Stretch-Wrap without conveyor
by 1 man, instead of 2 men. Working of
machine, weighing, loading, unloading and
storing pallets.
8. Deliver samples (boxes on skids) to Stock
Room - other end of mill.
9. Short-cutting shipment checking - helps the
clerk, but at times puts more work on us.
Prevents delay of shipment.
10. Two (2) men handle the shipping, loading and
unloading of trailers. Three (3) men did the
job before.
11. Have responsibility that previously were that
of the foreman.
12. Do porter's work.
(Fork Lift operators at Philip Morris, unloading the pallets we load, get $8.75 per
hour, compared to the rate of $7.11 for the
Fork Lift operation and working at more than
one type of job.)
At the second hearing, the Union set forth additional
changes in the job dealing with the operation of the fork lift;
the handling of pallets, use of inspection sheets and other inspectional duties, the addition of the photo cell, the addition
of a stop button, jamming of the turntable, reduction of personnel,
utilization of the "small machine," loading of trucks, labeling,
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use of conversion tables and the performance of work previously
done by utility men.
The Union, and particularly the testimony of Walter Bonus,
have ably and persuasively established that the duties enumerated
at the first and second hearings are now part of the shipperpacker job.

Also, the testimony and evidence indicate that all

or a significant number of those duties and responsibilities may
not have been part of the job or as demanding a part, when the
separate shipper and packer classifications were merged.
However the fatal flaw in the Union's case and in Mr.
Bonus' testimony is that the probative evidence shows that those

i
duties and responsibilities were in place as part of the job,
with the same magnitude, and were accounted for and accomodated
by and at the time of the settlement of grievance S-5 in July
1978, which increased the hourly rate of the shipper-packer job
by 10^.
That grievance settlement reads:
Management will give a 10^ per hour wage
adjustment to the shipper-packers for the
operation of the stretch wrap equipment
and the total responsibility for the package . This adjustment will be retroactive
to July 12, 1978. (emphasis added)
I am persuaded that the "total responsibility for the
package" was the subject of the subsequent meeting on March 9,
1979 between the Company and the Shipping Department employees,
and that the Company's minutes of that meeting (Company Exhibit
8) accurately reflect the discussion and the agreement on what

-4was expected of the shipper-packagers for the 10^ an hour rate
increase.
A review of those minutes show that the parties discussed
.
all or virtually all the duties and responsibilities which the
Union now claims are "changes" that post-dated that settlement.
I conclude therefore that the settlement of grievance S-5 and
the rate increase of 10^ an hour were in consideration for the

I
performance by the shipper-packers of virtually all the duties
in contest in this arbitration.

And that therefore those duties

and responsibilities do not represent new or additional changes
justifying an additional rate increase.

I construe the Company's
i

third step answer settling grievance S-5, and particularly the
language "the total responsibility for the package," to encompass all the contested duties and responsibilities of the job in
"packaging" pallets and the product, not just handling the "wrap
equipment." If, as the Union claims, the 10^ increase was solely
because of new duties in handling the stretch wrap equipment,
the additional settlement language "and the total responsibility
for the package" would be unnecessary and meaningless.

I am

satisfied that that additional language has its own meaning, and
that it was meant and understood to apply to all the duties enumerated in the notes of the meeting of March 9, 1979.
As those duties and responsibilities fall with the "total"
job of "responsibility

for the package" and as the Company paid

10^ an hour extra for the performance and assumption thereof by

i
the shipper-packers, those duties and responsibilities cannot
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now be claimed as "changes" or "new" for another rate increase.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the collective bargaining agreement when it denied
grievance no. 555556.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 25, 1983
STATE OF New York )ss
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 201, United Association of
Journeymen and Apprentices of the
Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry,
AFL-CIO

RULING
Case No. 1330 0147 83

and
Shaker, Travis & Quinn, Inc.

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement between the above named Union
and Employer, the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator
on a work assignment dispute.
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association in New York City on June 16, 1983 at which time
representatives of the Union and Employer appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.
waived.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

A stenographic record was taken.

Local 38 of the Sheet

Metal Workers International Association, AFL-CIO was also represented at the hearing.

At the conclusion of the hearing the

Arbitrator granted a motion by Local 38 removing it as a party
to the arbitration.
This Ruling is in response to and dispositive of the
Employer's motion that the arbitration be stayed pending a final
decision by the National Labor Relations Board in a Section 10(K)
proceeding and/or in related court actions.
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The Employer's request for a stay is predicated upon its
claim that the arbitration proceeding will be superseded by
whatever decision the NLRB and/or the court ultimately render
in the litigation arising from the underlying jurisdictional
dispute.

Although an employer's determination to assign disputed

work may trigger litigation in different forums, it is well
settled that an arbitrator has the limited responsibility to
determine whether the collective bargaining agreement has been
violated.

An arbitrator is not entrusted with the broader power

of reconciling companion cases before administrative agencies or
judicial bodies.

The court is the forum vested with the author-

ity to issue stays of arbitration.

For an arbitrator to stay an

arbitration proceeding in such a circumstance would exceed the
authority that the parties have given him.

He would then be

making policy determinations involving the jurisdiction of other
forums beyond the question of whether a violation of a contract
occurred.
In the instant case the court refused to stay this
arbitration.

The Union has alleged a contract violation related

to a specific provision of the contract between the parties.
The arbitrator is obligated to determine whether the grievance
is meritorious.

To delay that decision pending the outcome of

a NLRB case or related actions in court is to accord a preeminence to a cause of action founded on statute over a different
cause of action sounded in contract breach.

Though the ultimate

outcome may support that pre-eminence, it is not for the
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arbitrator to so rule at this point.
This interpretation is consistent with the conflicting
decisions cited by the parties.

Although Carey v. Westinghouse,

375 U.S. 261, 272 (1963), indicates that an employer would not
be liable for damages under Section 301 if it assigned work in
accordance with an NLRB decision of a jurisdictional dispute,
the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in W. R. Grace &
Co. v. United Rubber Workers, 51 U.S.L.W. 4643 (May 31,
(9-0), arguably supports a contrary finding.

1983)

Specifically, the

Grace Court concluded that a company that had entered into a
conciliation agreement as a result of a Title VII action could
be liable for damages under a collective bargaining agreement
that conflicted with the terms of the conciliation agreement.
The Court reasoned as follows:
The Company voluntarily assumed its obligations
under the collective bargaining agreement and
the arbitrator's interprestions of it. No public
policy is violated by holding the Company to those
obligations . . . .
Id. at 4646.

In addition, the Court observed that:

Compensatory damages may be available to a
plaintiff injured by a breach of contract
even when specific performance of the contract would violate public policy.
I_d. at 4646 n.13.
On the basis of these conflicting decisions it may be that
the appropriate court will not enforce an arbitrator's award for
damages in the present case if the statutory 10(K)
otherwise.

decision is

That is a matter however for the court, if this
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Arbitrator should award damages once the merits of the case are
addressed.
Nor does the contract or prevailing arbitration law
permit the arbitrator to consider the litigation costs to the
Employer under the circumstances of the instant case as a basis
for issuing a stay.
Accordingly, the Employer's request for a stay of the
arbitration proceeding is denied.
the case shall be scheduled.

A hearing on the merits of

The parties rights in any other

forum are expressly reserved.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September 2, 1983
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) " " "
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my RULING.

Local 144, Hotel, Hospital,
Nursing Home & Allied Services
Union, SEIU, AFL-CIO
FACT-FINDING
-andSheepshead Nursing Home

In accordance with a letter dated June 30, 1982 and jointly signed by representatives of the above named Union and Home,
the Undersigned was designated as the advisory mediator and
fact-finder over disputes concerning certain terms and conditions
of the collective bargaining agreement between said parties.
Hearings on disputes over wages, contributions to the Funds
and related economic matters affecting the blue collar employees,
the RNs and the LPNs were held on March llth and April 12th,
1983.

Representatives of both sides appeared and full opportun-

ity was accorded all concerned to present their cases.
An initial mediation effort failed to produce an agreement.
Accordingly, pursuant to my authority as Fact-finder, and based
on the record before me, I make the following Fact-finding
Recommendations;
The Home shall increase wages by $10
(ten dollars) a week effective October
1, 1982.
The Home shall further increase wages
by $15 (fifteen dollars) a week effective April 1, 1983.
The Undersigned shall retain jurisdiction
over this case and all remaining issues,
including the Home's remaining indebtedness
under the Master industry contract. On
the remaining issues the Undersigned will
convene further meetings of the parties
and/or hearings within the near future.

Eric J. Schmertz
Fact-Finder
DATED: April 18, 1983

Local 144, Hotel, Hospital,
Nursing Home & Allied Services
Union, SEIU, AFL-CIO
and

FACT-FINDING

Sheepshead Nursing Home

A further hearing in the above matter was held on June
1, 1983.

Representatives of both sides appeared and were

afforded full opportunity to present their cases.
I make the following Fact-Finding Recommendations in
addition to and in enforcement of my Recommendations of April
18, 1983:
a) The Home shall pay to the employees no
later than during the week of June 6,
1983 the full retroactivity of the $10
a week wage increase referred to in the
first paragraph of my April 18, 1983
Recommendations.
b) No later than during the week of July 4,
1983, the Home shall pay to the employees
the full amount retroactively due said
employees for the transportation allowance.
c) No later than during the week of August
1, 1983 the Home shall pay to the employees
the full amount retroactively due said employees for the meal allowance.
d) All aspects of my Recommendations of April
18, 1983 are affirmed and shall continue
to be implemented,,
e) I retain jurisdiction over this case and all
remaining issues in dispute. A further hearing on the remaining issues is scheduled for
July 11, 1983 beginning at 2 PM at the Unionfe
offices.

DATED: June 3, 1983

Eric J. Schmertz
Fact-Finder

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers
Local 8-917

OPINION AND AWARD
' Case #83K/24533
Grievance No. 7-83

and
The Sherwin-Williams

Company

The stipulated issue is:
Is the grievance arbitrable? If it is
arbitrable did the Company have the right
to promulgate a rule which changed washup and punch-out times prior to the lunch
period and at the end of the shift? If
not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on November 10, 1983 at which time
representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived, and the parties filed posthearing memoranda.

At the hearing I ruled that the grievance was
arbitrable.
The Company has stipulated in the record that the
objective of the rule change was to prevent employees from
leaving the plant ten minutes before the end of their workday and to prevent them from leaving their work places unattended, five minutes before the lunch break.
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I find those objectives to be reasonable, insofar
as they are based on a demonstrated need for efficiency,
including greater productivity, and discipline.

The

objective of the rule change is consistent with the well
settled right of an employer to require employees to work
or be present in the plant for their entire shift.
The Company has also stipulated that it is not the
objective of the rule to eliminate a five minute wash-up
period before the lunch break or to eliminate a ten minute
period for wash-up and showers before the end of the shift.
Rather the Company has acknowledged

that under the changed

rule, affected employees may still leave their work stations
five minutes before the lunch break and ten minutes before
the end of their shift, to wash-up and/or take showers if
they wish, provided as before, they are relieved at those
earlier times by the next shift employees reporting to work
or to the work stations early.
Accordingly, the Undersigned duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company had the right to promulgate
a rule which changed wash-up and punchout times prior to the lunch period and
at the end of the shift. The rule promulgated is reasonable and within the
meaning of the contract to promote greater
efficiency and discipline, provided employees
who are relieved by other employees may
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leave their work stations five minutes
before the lunch period and ten minutes
before the end of their shift to respectively wash-up and shower if they wish.
However, the rule properly prohibits employees from punching-out or leaving the
plant before the regular end of their
work shift.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 22, 1983
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my
Oath as Arbitrator that I am the individual described
in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD,

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO
C.L.C., Local 450

OPINION
and
AWARD

and

Sperry Division, Division of
Sperry Corporation

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective bargaining agreement when it terminated Douglas Rogers?
If not what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on February 28, 1983 at the Company
offices at which time Mr. Rogers, hereinafter referred to as
the "grievant," and representatives of the above named Union
and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full oppor-

tunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

parties filed post-hearing briefs.
The issue, put another way, is whether the grievant was
unjustly discharged within the meaning of Article 26 Section
C of the contract.
The grievant, who had attendance problems for which he
received a written warning in 1981, was discharged because he
failed to return to work in accordance with the instructions
of the Company's Medical Director following the completion of
a medical leave of absence.
It is the Company's position that based upon an examinination by its Medical Director, the grievant no longer suffered
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from a back injury and despite reports from his own physician,
was physically capable of resuming work.

The Company's case

suggests that the grievant was malingering and/or that he used
the extra time off from work in order to engage in an outside
busine ss.
From the record before me I am unable to tell whether the
grievant suffered back pain when his medical leave expired,
and there is insufficient probative evidence to determine
whether he improperly used the extra time during or subsequent
to the end of his medical leave for outside business purposes.
The Company is suspicious in both regards, but has proved
neither.
What I do conclude from the record is that the Company had
reasonable grounds to accept and act on the diagnosis of its
Medical Director, and that nothing presented by the grievant
was substantial enough to rebut that diagnosis.

However, as the

Company does not charge the grievant with insubordination, and
in view of my other findings, the grievant's failure to return
to work at the conclusion of his medical leave and as instructed
by the Medical Director, constitutes another attendance violation
on his part.
I am satisfied that even if the grievant still suffered
back pain he had no right to ignore the end of his medical leave
or the instructions of the Medical Director.

He should have

reported to work and then notified the Company of his continuing
problems, or at least communicated with the Company forthwith
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at the end of his leave and requested additional time supported
by medical documentation.

That he did not, is a violation of

company rules and policies on attendance and leaves of absence.
Discipline is warranted but not the severe penalty of discharge.

As an attendance matter, the grievant is entitled to

the imposition and benefit of "progressive discipline."

His

prior disciplinary record, assuming its applicability in this
proceeding, contains a warning in 1980 for "falsification of
a time card" and a written warning in 1981 for attendance
violations.

He has never been suspended.

For the instant

offense a suspension is the proper penalty.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties makes the following AWARD:
The termination of Douglas Rogers is changed
to a suspension. He shall be reinstated, but
without back pay.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: April 25
STATE OF New York)
COUNTY OF New York)

qC

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers
Union, Local 8-575, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Grievance No. E-772

and
Tenneco Chemicals, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Appendix C of
the collective bargaining agreement by
denying disability benefits to Edward
Markalik for the period January 12 to
January 22, 1982? If so what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held on September 28, 1983 at which time
Mr. Markalik, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and
representatives of the above named Union arid Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
: 'V: The part of Appendix C pertinent to this case reads:
>v v
-

;

^
; f

I.

Purpose

It is the purpose of the Supplementary disability Benefits Plan to assist employees
during absence due to illness or injury by
granting them pay or part pay during such
periods. The program is designed to supplement amounts, if any, received during this
time by the employee from the State or other
non-occupational benefit fund or received
from Worker's Compensation.
II.

Definition

Disability benefits are salary or wage payments granted because of absence from work
caused by illness or injury. An employee

-2entitled to supplementary disability benefits pay in accordance with the Schedule
of Payments below is not entitled to payments such as holiday pay, jury duty pay,
death in the family pay, etc. during such
period.
III.

Schedule of Payments

Prior Length of Service

Maximum Number
of Benefits Weeks

5 years to 10 years

15 (See Note 2.)

Note 2.
An employee, otherwise eligible for benefit payments with five (5) or more years
service, will receive 50% of his daily
wages for each of the first five (5) worki
days of disability absence. If the disability exists for more than five (5) work
days, the full benefit (100%) will be retroactively paid providing satisfactory medical
evidence of disability is submitted.
,

It is undisputed that the grievant was in an auto accident

in September 1981.

Due to injuries sustained he was out of work

on disability and received disability pay benefits from September
22, 1981 until November 30, 1981.

His disability for that period

of time was documented by his physician and is not challenged by
the Company.
On December 1, the grievant returned to work and continued
at work through December 7 when he went on vacation.

He was

scheduled to return to work from vacation on January 4, 1982 but
did not do so.
he was sick.

Instead he called his foreman ,and reported that
The grievant and the Union on his behalf assert

that the grievant had a "relapse" during the vacation; was treate

-3by his physician for the renewed disability during that time,
and was not able to return to work until January 22, 1982.

The

grievant's claim of renewed disability is supported by a statemen
from his physician dated January 8, 1982 which indicates treatments inter alia on December 10, 17, 29, and January 6 and 8.
The statement also indicates that the grievant should be able to
return to work on January 27, 1982.
"Suspicious" of the claimed "relapse" during the vacation,
and especially because he had returned to work for the period
December 1-7, the Company directed the grievant to report to the
Company's physician for an examination.
place on January 12, 1982.
"able to return to work."

That examination took

The Company doctor found the grievant
As previously indicated, the grievant

did not do so until January 22nd, hence the Company's denial of
disability benefits for the period January 12 to January 22, 1982
Note 2, recited above, calls for:
'

."satisfactory medical evidence of disability..."

In this case I do not find that the Company was arbitrary
or unreasonable in deciding that the grievant's medical evidence
claiming disability for the period January 12 to January 22 was
unsatisfactory.
Following his initial and undisputed disability, the grievant was released by his doctor to return to work on December 1.
He returned to work that day and worked until the start of his
vacation.
A subsequent claim -that immediately upon commencement of

-4his vacation, during the vacation, and for a period thereafter
the disability returned, gives rise to a reasonable view that
the grievant wished to extend his vacation and used the disabilitj
claim to achieve that result.

Such an understandable presumption

under those coincidental circumstances, shifts the burden to the
grievant to prove the bonafides of the renewed disability.

In

this case the grievant and the Union on his behalf have not met
that burden.
No direct or in-person medical testimony was offered or
adduced.

I am not prepared to accept the doctorVs statement of

January 8, 1982 as sufficient probative evidence to rebut the
presumption, especially in view of the fact that the same
•

physician had released the grievant for return to work on
December 1, 1981 and the Company physician found, in the January
12th examination, that the grievant was fit to return to work.
: i

Most significant to my mind was one part of the grievant's

testimony both on direct and on cross-examination.

In his direct

examination he did not disclose that he had returned to work for
the period December 1 through December 7, and on cross-examinatior
he denied that he had done so. I do not believe that he forgot
about that period.

Rather, I must conclude that he sought to

hide that fact because he knew or thought that it would prejudice
his case.

In that respect his credibility was impeached in a

relevant and important area of the case, and it places in serious
question the accuracy or veracity of his claim of a "relapse" or
"renewed disability."

That, together with the inadequacy of othe

-5-

evidence in support of his claim leaves the claim unproved and
the aforementioned presumption unrebutted.

Under that circum-

stance I do not find that the grievant submitted "satisfactory
medical evidence of disability" for the disputed period January
12 to January 22,

1982.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate Appendix C of
the collective bargaining agreement by
denying disability benefits to Edward
Markalik for the period January 12 to
January 22, 1982.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: November 22, 1983
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )ss''
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers
Union, Local 8-575, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Grievance No. E-772

and

Tenneco Chemicals, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Appendix C of
the collective bargaining agreement by
denying disability benefits to Edward
Markalik for the period January 12 to
January 22, 1982? If so what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held on September 28, 1983 at which time
Mr. Markalik, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and
representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The part of Appendix C pertinent to this case reads:
I.

Purpose

It is the purpose of the Supplementary disability Benefits Plan to assist employees
during absence due to illness or injury by
granting them pay or part pay during such
periods. The program is designed to supplement amounts, if any, received during this
time by the employee from the State or other
non-occupational benefit fund or received
from Worker's Compensation.
II.

Definition

Disability benefits are salary or wage payments granted because of absence from work
caused by illness or injury. An employee

The

-2-

entitled to supplementary disability benefits pay in accordance with the Schedule
of Payments below is not entitled to payments such as holiday pay, jury duty pay,
death in the family pay, etc. during such
period.
III.

Schedule of Payments

Prior Length of Service

Maximum Number
of Benefits Weeks

5 years to 10 years

15 (See Note 2.)

Note 2.
An employee, otherwise eligible for benefit payments with five (5) or more years
service, will receive 50% of his daily
wages for each of the first five (5) work
days of disability absence. If the disability exists for more than five (5) work
days, the full benefit (100%) will be retroactively paid providing satisfactory medical
evidence of disability is submitted.
It is undisputed that the grievant was in an auto accident
in September 1981.

Due to injuries sustained he was out of work

on disability and received disability pay benefits from September
22, 1981 until November 30, 1981.

His disability for that period

of time was documented by his physician and is not challenged by
the Company.
On December 1, the grievant returned to work and continued
at work through December 7 when he went on vacation.

He was

scheduled to return to work from vacation on January 4, 1982 but
did not do so.
he was sick.

Instead he called his foreman and reported that
The grievant and the Union on his behalf assert

that the grievant had a "relapse" during the vacation; was treatec
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by his physician for the renewed disability during that time,
and was not able to return to work until January 22, 1982.

The

grievant's claim of renewed disability is supported by a statement
from his physician dated January 8, 1982 which indicates treatments inter alia on December 10, 17, 29, and January 6 and 8.
The statement also indicates that the grievant should be able to
return to work on January 27, 1982.
"Suspicious" of the claimed "relapse" during the vacation,
and especially because he had returned to work for the period
December 1-7, the Company directed the grievant to report to the
Company's physician for an examination.
place on January 12, 1982.
"able to return to work."

That examination took

The Company doctor found the grievant
As previously indicated, the grievant

did not do so until January 22nd, hence the Company's denial of
disability benefits for the period January 12 to January 22, 1982.
Note 2, recited above, calls for:
"satisfactory medical evidence of disability..."
In this case I do not find that the Company was arbitrary
or unreasonable in deciding that the grievant's medical evidence
claiming disability for the period January 12 to January 22 was
unsatisfactory.
Following his initial and undisputed disability, the grievant was released by his doctor to return to work on December 1.
He returned to work that day and worked until the start of his
vacation.
A subsequent claim that immediately upon commencement of

-4his vacation, during the vacation, and for a period thereafter
the disability returned, gives rise to a reasonable view that
the grievant wished to extend his vacation and used the disability
claim to achieve that result.

Such an understandable presumption

under those coincidental circumstances, shifts the burden to the
grievant to prove the bonafides of the renewed disability.

In

this case the grievant and the Union on his behalf have not met
that burden.
No direct or in-person medical testimony was offered or
adduced.

I am not prepared to accept the doctor's statement of

January 8, 1982 as sufficient probative evidence to rebut the
presumption, especially in view of the fact that the same
physician had released the grievant for return to work on
December 1, 1981 and the Company physician found, in the January
12th examination, that the grievant was fit to return to work.
Most significant to my mind was one part of the grievant's
testimony both on direct and on cross-examination.

In his direct

examination he did not disclose that he had returned to work for
the period December 1 through December 7, and on cross-examination
he denied that he had done so. I do not believe that he forgot
about that period.

Rather, I must conclude that he sought to

hide that fact because he knew or thought that it would prejudice
his case.

In that respect his credibility was impeached in a

relevant and important area of the case, and it places in serious
question the accuracy or veracity of his claim of a "relapse" or
"renewed disability."

That, together with the inadequacy of other

-5evidence in support o£ his claim leaves the claim unproved and
the aforementioned presumption unrebutted.

Under that circum-

stance I do not find that the grievant submitted "satisfactory
medical evidence of disability" for the disputed period January
12 to January 22,

1982.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate Appendix C of
the collective bargaining agreement by
denying disability benefits to Edward
Markalik for the period January 12 to
January 22, 1982.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: November 22, 1983
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) SS * "
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

